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The Constitutional Limitations on State
Choice of Law: Due Process
By RALPH U. WHITTEN*

Introduction
During the twentieth century the Supreme Court of the United
States has, in varying degrees, applied the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment' and the full faith and credit clause2 to limit

state choice-of-law authority. For a time, the Court placed greater restrictions on state power under the full faith and credit clause than
under the due process clause;' however, in its most recent decisions, the
Court has indicated that both clauses impose identical limitations on
the states.4 The standard now governing state choice-of-law authority

requires a state to have a "significant contact" with a case such that the
state has a legitimate interest in having its law applied.5 Essentially
this means that the application of a state's law to a controversy will not
be constitutionally invalidated unless the state has no legitimate inter6
est in controlling the transaction or occurrence underlying the dispute.

The Court's adoption of this standard seems to confirm the view of the
* Professor of Law, Creighton University. B.B.A., 1966, J.D. 1969, University of
Texas; L.L.M., 1972, Harvard University.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
3. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981); Alaska Packers Ass'n
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 495-547 (2d ed. 1980).
4. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). See also id. at 320-32
(Stevens, J., concurring); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954).
5. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-11, 320 (1981). Recent useful
commentary on411state can be found in Hill, Choice ofLaw and Jurisdictionin the Supreme
Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1981); Shreve, In Search ofa Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard--Relectionson Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REv. 327 (1982); Symposium, Choice-of-Law Theory after Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv.
(1981); Symposium, Choice ofLaw, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 841 (1981).
6. "[N]either [the due process clause nor the full faith and credit clause] interferes with
choice of law except when the law applied is that of a state having no legitimate interest in
the application of its policy to the case at hand." B. CURRIE, The Constitutionandthe Choice
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late Professor Brainerd Currie that "the Due Process Clause and the
. . . Full Faith and Credit Clause control state decision only in. . . the
'false-problem' cases: ie., cases in which one state has a legitimate interest and the other has none."'
The significant contact standard imposes only a "modest check on
state power."8 Nevertheless, it is probable that the Court has gone too
far under both the due process clause and the full faith and credit
clause in restricting state choice-of-law authority. I have argued elsewhere that the full faith and credit clause, properly interpreted, imposes no direct limitations on state choice-of-law decisions, although it
does authorize Congress to establish nationwide conffict-of-laws rules
to govern the states.9 The purpose of this article is to evaluate the due
process restrictions that may legitimately be .placed on state power to
choose the law applicable to a case. The article concludes that the
Court's selection of standards with which to restrict state choice of law
has exceeded the proper boundaries of the due process clause.
The evidence examined in later sections will demonstrate that the
broadest legitimate principle incorporated within the due process
clause is that no person may be deprived of a right without first being
given an opportunity to be heard defending that right in a judicial proceeding. A "substantive" application of this opportunity to be heard
principle is that a state may not enact laws that retroactively deprive a
person of his rights. This nonretroactivity application was probably
understood to be an appropriate part of due process of law at the time
of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it forms the basis
for a legitimate, but limited, choice-of-law restriction on the states.
of Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 195 (1963). But see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 505.
7. B. CURRIE, Supra note 6, at 193.
8. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 332 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
9. See Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitationson State Choice of Law: FullFaithand
Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Whitten-Choice ofLaw]. I
have also argued elsewhere that neither the full faith and credit clause nor the due process
clause incorporates rules of judicial jurisdiction that are based on a policy of protecting the
status of the states as coequal sovereigns in the federal system, though the full faith and
credit clause permits such an inquiry into sovereignty-based, territorial limits on state court
jurisdiction, and the due process clause authorizes the judicial innovation of "conveniencebased" limits on jurisdiction in order to protect the defendant's opportunity to be heard. See
generally Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitationson State-CourtJurisdiction-A HistoricalInterpretativeReexamination Ofthe Full Faithand Credit andDue Process Clauses (pt. 1), 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Whitten q]; Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitationson State-CourtJurisdiction-AHistorical-InterpretativeReexamination ofthe Full

Faithand CreditandDue Process Clauses (pt. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Whitten II].
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This restriction is, however, far narrower than even the "modest check
on state power" currently enforced by the Court, and the due process
clause will not support any other limit on state authority.
Section I of this article briefly examines the development of general choice-of-law restrictions on the states under the due process
clause in order to establish a modem context for the historical interpretative issues to be examined in the remainder of the article. Section II
investigates the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause by surveying the development of due process prior to the
formation of the Constitution. Section III analyzes the state and federal decisions on the meaning of due process of law before the Fourteenth Amendment; this pre-Fourteenth Amendment context will
provide the most important evidence of the probable general understanding of due process of law held by the ratifiers of the Amendment.
Section IV examines the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment for such light as those events may throw on the meaning
of due process. The examination of the framing and ratification materials in section IV will be limited because there is no direct evidence on
the choice-of-law issues of central concern to this article in the framing
and ratification period, and because the evidence drawn from the "legislative history" of the Amendment is so much less reliable than the
pre-Fourteenth Amendment context in establishing the general understanding of the due process clause. Section V considers the legitimate
extent to which choice-of-law limitations on the states can be derived
from the general understanding of due process of law established in the
previous sections. This article concludes with a discussion of why the
original, general understanding of due process of law in the Fourteenth
Amendment should control today.
I.

The Evolution of Due Process Limitations on State
Choice-of-Law Authority

At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the dominant mode of conflicts analysis in substantive matters was, and had
been for some time, the rule of lex loci.'0 Thus, where issues of judicial' I and legislative 2 jurisdiction were involved, the focus was on con10. See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Arno ed.
1972) (1st ed. n.p. 1834).
11. See generally Whitten I, supra note 9.
12. See generally R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW:

THE

DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM

87 (1977); Whitten I, supra note 9.

78-
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cepts of territorial sovereignty.' 3 After the adoption of the
Amendment, these same territorialist concepts were incorporated by
the Supreme Court into the due process clause in order to limit state

judkial and legislative power. In the area of judicial jurisdiction, the
incorporation was accomplished through the now-famous decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff. 4 In the area of legislative jurisdiction, the Court
similarly used territorial rules to restrict state power to tax under the
due process clause, 5 and also placed more general territorial
limita6
tions on state choice-of-law authority under the clause.'
One of the earliest cases in which the Court invalidated a state's

power to apply its law to an event was the "substantive due process"

decision of Allgeyer v. Louisiana.17 Allgeyer involved a Louisiana stat-

ute prohibiting the procurement of insurance on property located
within the state from any marine insurance company that had not complied with conditions of Louisiana law for doing business within the
state. In a criminal prosecution, the state charged E. Allgeyer & Company with violating this statute by mailing a letter from Louisiana to
New York, thereby notifying a New York insurance company of a
shipment of cotton from Louisiana to certain foreign ports. The letter
was sent in compliance with the terms of an open marine insurance
policy issued by the New York company to defendant.'

The defend-

13. See generally J. STORY, supra note 10.
14. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). For criticism of Tennoyer, see Whitten I & II, supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Buck v. Beach, 206
U.S. 392 (1907); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907);
Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905); Delaware, Lackawanna
& W. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905); Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v.
Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903). For a complete discussion of the evolution of due process
limits on the power to tax, see H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 62100 (4th ed. 1964). See also 1J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 521, 627
(1935); Note, Developments in the Law--State Taxation, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953, 961-62
(1962). For a brief description of the status of due process restrictions on state taxing power
today, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 122-23 (3d ed. 1977). The taxing power
cases are not further considered in this article, though the due process analysis advocated
here would apply equally to them.
16. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text infra.
17. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
18. The defendants exported cotton to purchasers in Great Britain and Europe. Their
practice was to draw a bill of exchange for each sale on the purchaser and attach to it a bill
of lading on the cotton and an order for a new and separate insurance policy on the Atlantic
Mutual Insurance Company in New York. These documents were sent from New Orleans
to New York, where the bill of exchange either would be negotiated or forwarded to the
purchaser for collection. The bill of exchange could not be negotiated in New York unless
accompanied by both the bill of lading and order for insurance, and unless the policy issued
by Atlantic Mutual was attached to the bill of exchange, the purchaser of the cotton was
under no obligation to pay the bill. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 581-82.
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ant argued that the statute deprived it of its property without due process of law. This defense was rejected by the Louisiana Supreme
Court, and the case was taken by writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the United States.'
The Court held the Louisiana statute unconstitutional, declaring
that Louisiana had no right to prohibit a citizen of the state from making a contract outside the limits of the state. 20 The Court found that the
open marine insurance policy had been made outside the state and that
the notification by defendants of the cotton shipment was merely a
"collateral matter . . . an act performed pursuant to a valid contract
which the State had no right or jurisdiction to prevent its citizens from
making outside the limits of the State.'
Consequently, the attempted
prohibition was held to violate the liberty of the defendants to
contract.22
Although the Court at one time indicated that a state court's "mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of laws" did not amount to
a violation of the due process clause,23 the Allgeyer territorialism concept generally controlled the due process validity of state choice-of-law
decisions for the first third of the twentieth century. Under territorial
restrictions applied in accord with the lex loci, the states were permitted
to restrict liberty of contract when the contract in question was made
within the state.24 The due process clause was held, however, to prohibit a state from controlling activities occurring in other places, or
19. Id. at 583.
20. Id. at 591-92.
21. Id. at 592.
22. Id. at 591.
23. Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (in suit to quiet title to land located
within state, state court held plaintiff's rights under contract of sale made and to be performed in another state had been eliminated by proceedings to cancel contract brought in
state where land was located; the Court held plaintiff was afforded due process by finding of
default against him in his own suit to quiet title).
24. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 212-14 (1922) (law of state
where life insurance policy executed may constitutionally control parties' later loan agreement; the Constitution and "the first principles of legal thinking" allow law of place where
contract is made to control validity and consequences of the act); Selover, Bates & Co. v.
Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 123-25 (1912) (state may apply law of place where contract made to
contract to sell land located elsewhere without violating due process; it is "elementary" that
the obligation of a contract is determined by the law under which it was made); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 421 (1910) (state statute fixing
liability to telegraph company for nondelivery of messages does not violate telegraph company's liberty to contract for limited liability; contract made in state whose statute applied to
fix liability); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 398-401 (1900) (state where
insurance contract made has right to apply its statute to contract, notwithstanding policy
provision that provides law of another state shall control); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.
557, 563-67 (1899) (state where property located and contract made does not deny due pro-
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contracts technically "made" outside the state.2" For example, in Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick, 26 a policy of fire insurance was issued by a Mexican insurance company and assigned to a citizen of Texas then residing in Mexico. The Texan sued on the policy in a Texas state court by
garnishing the obligations of two United States insurance companies
that had reinsured part of the risk assumed by the Mexican company.
The garnishees defended on the ground that plaintiff had not commenced his action until more than one year after the date of the loss,
which would have barred the suit under a provision in the policy.
Texas law, however, provided that no agreement limiting the time
within which a party could sue to less than two years was valid. The
Texas courts applied Texas law over the objections of the garnishees,

who argued that this violated the due process and contract27 clauses.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this holding. 28 The Court
held in part that application of the Texas statute deprived the garnishees of property without due process of law. 29 The Court explained:
A State may ... prohibit and declare invalid the making of cer-

tain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit percess liberty of contract to foreign corporation by applying its statute fixing liability on policy
contrary to stipulation in contract).
25. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) (Missouri, place where insurance contract was made, deprived insurance company of liberty of contract without due
process by attempting to control parties' subsequent loan agreement-made in New Yorkwith Missouri law); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914) (Missouri, place
where insurance contract was made, violated insurance company's liberty of contract by
attempting to apply its law to loan agreement transacted in New Mexico and New York
between citizens of those states). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542,
547 (1914) (Holmes, J., for the Court) (when person recovers in one jurisdiction for tort
committed in another, he does so on grounds that an obligation was incurred at place of the
tort, and law of that place also determines maximum recovery; states may not constitutionally impose greater liability than that imposed by place of tort when to do so infringes on
power of United States to regulate conduct in District of Columbia); Cuba R.R. Co. v.
Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912) (Holmes, J., for the Court) (in diversity case, law of place where
tort occurred governs; plaintiff must prove that same obligation rests on defendant in a civil
law country as in United States-this cannot be presumed); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909) (state may not exact penalty for nondelivery of telegram within
limits of place under exclusive jurisdiction of United States); Slater v. Mexican Nat'1 R.R.
Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (Holmes, J., for the Court) (in diversity case, law of place of
tort governs existence and extent of liability; where right of recovery is so dissimilar to that
of state where action brought as to be incapable of enforcement, federal court must dismiss
action); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1891) (in diversity action, insurance policy was completed upon delivery of policy to insured in Missouri,
and consequently was a Missouri contract governed by laws of Missouri).
26. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
28. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 404-05.
29. Id. at 407-08.,
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formance within its borders, even of contracts validly made
elsewhere, if they are required to be performed within the State
and their performance would violate its laws. But in the case at
bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the
contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in
Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy were done in
Mexico. All in relation to the making of the contracts of reinsurance were done there or in New York. And, likewise, all things
in regard to performance were to be done outside of Texas ...
Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than
that agreed upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of
property without due process of law.30

A "territorial analysis" in due process cases seems to have prevailed as late as 1934. In HartfordAccident& Indemnity Co. v. Delta &
Pine Land Co. ,31 the Court invalidated an application of a Mississippi
statute that had the effect of annulling a limitations period in a contract
for a fidelity bond made in Tennessee. Mississippi asserted an interest

in applying its law to the contract because the employee whose honesty
was insured was in Mississippi at the time of the loss, because the loss
occurred there, and because both the insurance company and the plain-

tiff were doing business there.32 The Court, however, stated:
A state may limit or prohibit the making of certain contracts
within its own territory. . . but it cannot extend the effect of its
laws beyond its borders so as to destroy or impair the right of
citizens of other states to make a contract not operative within its
30. Id. Later, the Court added: "We need not consider how far the State may go in
imposing restrictions on the conduct of its own residents, and of foreign corporations which
have received permission to do business within its borders; or how far it may go in refusing
to lend the aid of its courts to the enforcement of rights acquired outside its borders. It may
not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or
to be done within them." Id. at 410.
See also Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), in which a New York statute making the
owner of an automobile liable for personal injuries caused by someone to whom the owner
had lent the car was applied to a nonresident owner. The Court upheld this application
against a due process challenge, arguing that because the owner had entered into a contract
of bailment in the state of his residence that conferred immunity on him from liability over
the driver's negligence, the New York statute, by imposing liability, deprived him of his
liberty to contract. The Court responded to this argument by explaining that "the contract
of bailment could not have conferred upon the owner immunity from liability to third persons for the driver's negligence. Liability for a tort depends upon the law of the place of the
injury, and (apart from the effect of the full faith and credit clause, which is not here involved) agreements made elsewhere cannot curtail the power of a State to impose responsibility for injuries within its borders." Id. at 258.
31. 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
32. The contract protected the plaintiff from loss from the dishonesty of any employee,
in any position, anywhere. Id. at 145.
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jurisdiction, and lawful where made. . . . Nor may it in an action based upon such a contract enlarge the obligations of the
parties to accord with every local statutory policy solely upon the
ground that one of the parties is its own citizen. . . . Conceding
that ordinarily a state may prohibit performance within its borders even of a contract validly made elsewhere, if the performance would violate its laws. . . it may not, on grounds of policy,
ignore a right which has lawfully vested elsewhere, if, as here, the
interest of the forum has but slight connection with the substance
of the contract obligations. . . In such a case the question ought
to be regarded as a domestic one to be settled by the law of the
state where the contract was made. A legislative policy which
attempts to draw to the state of the forum control over the obligations of contracts elsewhere validly consummated and to convert
them for all purposes into contracts of the forum, regardless of
the relative importance of the interests of the forum as contrasted
with those created at the place of the contract, conflicts with the
guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Although the Court spoke partly in terms of the state's interest in
applying its law, it seems clear that Delta & PineLand did not represent
a shift from a territorial analysis to a "state interest analysis" under the
due process clause. One commentator observed that, "Although the
Court spoke of governmental interests, it treated this as *an argument
that Mississippi might apply its law as that of the place of performance."3 4 Another stated that, "In its Delta & Pine Land opinion the
Court gave lip service to the significance of the forum's interests in applying its own law, but was apparently controlled by . . . notions of

'vested rights.'

",3

Nevertheless, soon after Delta & PineLand there were perceptible
changes in the Court's analytical method in due process cases. In decisions involving the full faith and credit clause, the Court had, in the
early part of the century, also employed a territorial analysis to determine whether or not one state was obligated to enforce the "public
acts" of another.3 6 By 1932, however, the Court had clearly begun to
33. Id. at 149-50.
34. B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 234. Professor Currie also stated that "the Court's employment of the concept of governmental interest ... treats the interest of Mississippi as
being predicated on such artificialities as the place of payment rather than on incidents that
realistically warrant the application of policy .
" Id. at 235.
35. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 508.
36. See Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co.,
250 U.S. 2 (1919); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green. 237 U.S. 531 (1915);
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914); Converse v. Hamilton, 224
U.S. 243 (1912); El Paso & Northeastern Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87 (1909); National
Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635 (1904); Whitten--Choice ofLaw, supra
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shift its methodology in full faith and credit clause cases from a territorial to a state interest analysis. 37 The Court began the same sort of shift
under the due process clause in 1935, in 4laska PackersAssociation v.
IndustrialAccident Commission." Alaska Packers involved an award
of workmen's compensation benefits under the California Workmen's
Compensation Act that was challenged on due process and full faith
and credit grounds. The award was made to a worker who entered into
a written contract in California, whereby he agreed to work for Alaska
Packers in Alaska during the salmon canning season. The worker also
agreed to be bound by the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Act. He
was injured in Alaska and sought compensation under the California
Act. The Supreme Court sustained the power of California to award
benefits under these circumstances. Although there was some territorialist language in the Court's opinion,39 the Court's ultimate decision on
the due process issue was clearly evaluated in terms of California's legitimate interest in providing compensation to the injured worker.40
By 1943, the Court seemed to have abandoned the territorialist
approach altogether. In Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 4 ' the Court
described its past and present approaches to choice-of-law restrictions
in due process cases:
In determining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory
laws to insurance business activities, the question in earlier cases
note 9, at 46. See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), a case decided
on due process grounds, but which contained the following dictum concerning the full faith
and credit clause: "[W]e must consider. . . how far it was within the power of the State of
Missouri to extend its authority into the State of New York and there forbid the parties, one
of whom was a citizen of New Mexico and the other a citizen of New York, from making
[an] agreement in New York simply because it modified a contract originally made in Missouri. Such question, we think, admits of but one answer since it would be impossible to
permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State and in the
State of New York and there destroy freedom of contract without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the Constitution
depends. This is so obviously the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been
called in question and hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound. The principle however lies at the foundation of the full faith and credit clause and the many rulings
which have given effect to that clause." Id. at 161. For better reasons why "authorities
directly dealing with it" did "not abound," see Whitten-Choice ofLaw, supranote 9, at I 156.
37. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 131 (1932); B. CuRRME, supra note
6, at 205-07; R. WEiNTRAUB, supranote 3, at 518-19; Whitten-ChoiceofLaw, supra note 9,
at 6-7.
38. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
39. See id. at 540-41.
40. See id. at 542-43; B. CunmEa supra note 6, at 201-03.
41. 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
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became involved by conceptualistic discussion of theories of the
place of contracting or of performance. [CitingAllgeyer v. Louisiana.] More recently it has been recognized that a state may have
substantial interests in the business of insurance of its people or
property regardless of these isolated factors. This interest may be
measured by highly realistic considerations such as the protection
of the citizen insured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss. [Citing Alaska PackersAssociation v. IndustrialAccident Commission.] 2
True to its word, the Court from Alaska Packers to the present has

uniformly refused to invalidate state laws on due process grounds when
a state has possessed a legitimate interest of any sort in applying its law
to a dispute.4 3 As indicated earlier, the Court, for a time, imposed

greater restrictions under the full faith and credit clause than under the
due process clause, but it has now established that the same standard

will govern cases challenging state choice-of-law decisions under both
clauses.44

Despite this lenient approach to state choice-of-law authority,
there are serious questions about the extent to which the Court now
limits state power under the due process clause. First, the language of
the clause does not seem to encompass the sort of "substantive" restrictions on state power that the Court now applies or has applied in the

past.45 Second, it is doubtful that the Court has been correct in restrict42. Id. at 316. See also Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 504-07 (1941) (state may
refuse to enforce contract insuring life of one of its citizens in favor of persons having no
insurable interest; this constitutes no violation of due process or full faith and credit).
43. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (neither due process nor full
faith and credit are violated by application of state law, when state has significant contact
with a case that creates legitimate interest in having its law applied); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1963) (due process not violated by application of state law unless
activities of company are slight and casual or wholly nonexistent), Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954) (Louisiana had legitimate interest in applying its direct action statute; therefore, due process not violated); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947) (District of Columbia's legitimate interest in providing workers' compensation does not depend on fortuitous circumstances of place of work or injury; it
depends on some substantial connection between the district and the employer-employee
relationship present in a particular case; as applied, statute satisfies due process and full faith
and credit); State Farm Ins. Mut. Auto Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1945) (Wisconsin's legitimate concern with financial soundness of companies writing insurance contracts
with its citizens permits it to apply its statute, dictating how unearned premium reserves
shall be calculated, consistent with due process clause).
44. See notes 3-7 and accompanying text supra; Whitten-ChoiceofLaw, supra note 9,
at 1, 6-10.
45. The language is: "No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 18 (1980): "[T]here is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows
'due' is 'process.' No evidence exists that 'process' meant something different a century ago
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ing state substantive power under the due process clause in a parallel

area: the territorial restrictions on state judicial jurisdiction. These
restrictions have evolved to protect the status of the states as coequal

sovereigns in the federal system, but, in all likelihood, they have been

erroneously incorporated into the clause.4 6 If so, there is reason to

question the Court's restriction of state sovereignty through choice-oflaw limitations formulated for similar purposes under the due process
clause. The following sections demonstrate that these questions about

the Court's approach to state choice-of-law authority under the clause
cannot be answered in support of this approach.
II. The Pre-Constitutional Background of Due
Process of Law
It is clear that in English law the expression "due process of law"
referred only to a general requirement of regular procedure in a court

by which a defendant might have the opportunity to be heard in defense.47 English and American concepts of due process originated in
the "law of the land clause" of the Magna Charta and its interpretation

by Sir Edward Coke.48 Chapter 39 of the Magna Charta, containing
the law of the land clause, translated from Latin, reads: "No freeman
shall be taken and imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or

in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor will we send upon
than it does now-in fact. . . the historical record runs somewhat the other way-and it
should take more than occasional abberational use to establish that those who ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment had an eccentric definition in mind. Familiarity breeds inattention,
and we apparently need periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction
in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness."' See also id. at 14-21.
46. See Whitten I & II, supra note 9. See also Redish, Due Process, Federalism,and
PersonalJurisdiction: 4 TheoreticalEvaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
47. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 743-44.
48. Important discussions of the origin of due process in the Magna Charta appear in R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 195-96 (1977); 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1103-04 (1953); A.E. HOWARD,
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 298-315 (1968); W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA 441

(1905); H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 128-40
(1977); R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1-87 (DaCapo ed. 1973); Berger, 'aw ofthe Land"
Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1979); Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Be/ore the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368-70 (1911); Denning, ConstitutionalDevelopments in Britain, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 116 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970); Guthrie,
Magna Charta, in MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER ADDRESSES I (Books for Libraries Press ed.
1969); Howe, The Meaning of "DueProcess ofLaw" Priorto the Adoption ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 583 (1930); Jurow, Untimely Thoughts.- AReconsiderationof
the OriginsofDue ProcessfLaw, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975); McIlwain, DueProcess
ofLaw in Magna Charta, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 27 (1914); Miller, The ForestofDue Processof
Law." The American ConstitutionalTradition, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 3, 4-11 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
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him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and per legem terrae
[literally, 'by the law of the land'].' 49 In explaining the phrase "by the
law of the land," Lord Coke stated: "No man shall be disseised...
unless it be by the lawful judgment, that is, verdict of his equals (that is,
of men of his own condition) or by the law of the land (that is, to speak
it once for all) by the due course, and proces of law." 50 Subsequently,
Lord Coke added:
For the true sense and exposition of these words [by the law of
the land], see the statute of 37 E. 3. cap. 8. where the words, by
the law of the land, are rendred without due proces of law, for
there it is said, though it be contained in the great charter, that no
man be taken, imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold without
proces of the law; that is, by indictment or presentment of good
and lawfull men, where such deeds be done in due manner, or by
writ originall of the common law.
Without being brought in to answere but by due proces of
the common law.
No man be put to answer without presentment before justices, or thing of record, or by due proces, or by writ originall,
according to the old law of the land.5
The phrase "due process of law" had appeared innumerous statutes at the time Coke wrote his Second Institute.52 In 1352, a statute
used the expressions "law of the land," "process made by writ original
at the common law," and "course of the law," to guarantee that no one
could be deprived of certain fundamental rights without an opportunity
to be heard in defense.53 Two years later, another statute provided
"[t]hat no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out
of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor
put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the
Law."5 " In 1368, a statute also provided that "no Man be put to answer
49. As translated in H. MEYER, supra note 48, at 128. See also A.E. HOWARD, supra
note 48 at 298. The original Latin text was as follows: "Nullus liber homo capiaturvel imprisonetur,aut disseisiatur,aut utlagetur,aut exceletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur,nec super
eum ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nise per legale fjudicium parium suorum el/per legem
terrae." As quoted in H. MEYER, supra note 48, at 128. See also Chapter 29 of Henry III's
Reissue of 1225, 9 Hen. III ch.29 (1225), quoted in E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (1642). Chapter 29 varied somewhat in wording.
See the Latin and translation in 1 Statutes at Large 7-8.
50. E. COKE, supra note 49, at 46.

51. Id. at50.
52. The statutes are discussed inJurow,supra note 48, at 266-7 1.See also H. MEYER,
supra note 48; Whitten II,
supra note 9,at 739-41.
53. 25-Edw. 3, Stat. 5,ch.4 (1352).
54. 28 Edw. 3, ch.3 (1354). A later portion of this same statute directed that the Mayor,
the Sheriffs, and the Aldermen of London should cause certain "Defaults, Errors, and Misprisons" to be corrected, or else their "Defaults of Good Governance" should be inquired
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without Presentment before Justices, or Matter of Record, or by due
Process and Writ original, according to the old Law of the Land: And
55
if any Thing. . . be done to the contrary, it shall be void. ....
.

From these authorities it strongly appears that the expression "due
process of law" was used in English law to describe a regular procedure

for summoning a person to trial in a judicial proceeding and adjudicating his civil or criminal liabilities. This observation is confirmed by
5
references in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. 1
Blackstone stated that the English Constitution "is an utter stranger to

any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without express

warrant of law."57 He added that it was "enacted . . . that no man
shall be forejudged of life or limb contrary to the great charter and the
law of the land: and again, by statute. . . that no man shall be put to

death, without being brought to answer by due process of law."'58 In
these passages Blackstone was speaking of the right of individuals to
personal security. Similar passages discuss the personal liberty of individuals59 and their right to property. 0 In his chapter on process,
Blackstone also stated that if an indictment were returned, process had

to issue to bring the accused into court, "for the indictment cannot be
tried, unless he personally appears, according to the rules of equity in
into by "Inquests of People of Foreign Counties," and if the officials were indicted by the
inquests, "they shall be caused to come by due process before the King's Justices." Id. at
ch. 10.
55. 42 Edw. 3, ch.3 (1368). See also 15 Rich. 2, ch.7 (1391), which provided that the
King's subjects should no longer be compelled to come before the "Council of any Lord or
Lady" (meaning a private court) "to answer for his Freehold, nor for any Thing touching his
Freehold, nor for any other Thing, real or personal, that belongeth to the Law of the Land in
Any Manner," and if so compelled, the Chancellor was directed to "give him Remedy."
56. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121-45.
57. Id. at * 132.
58. Id. at *133-34 (citations omitted).
59. Blackstone stated: "Here again the language of the great charter is, that no freeman
shall be taken or imprisoned but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the
land. And many subsequent old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or
imprisoned by suggestion or petition to the king or his council, unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of the common law. By the petition of right, 3 Car. I, it is enacted, that
no freeman shall be imprisoned or detained without cause shown, to which he may make
answer according to law." Id. at *134 (footnotes omitted).
60. Blackstone stated: "[Tihe great charter has declared that no freeman shall be disseised, or divested, of his freehold, or of his liberties, or free customs but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the law of the land. And by a variety of ancient statutes it is enacted that no
man's lands or goods shall be seized into the king's hands, against the great charter, and the
law of the land; and that no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or
freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course of law; and if
anything be done to the contrary it shall be redressed and holden for none." Id. at * 138
(footnotes omitted).
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all cases, and the express provision of statute. . . in capital ones, that
no man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer by due
61
process of law."
There is substantial scholarly opinion that Lord Coke was incorrect in concluding that "by the law of the land" meant "due process of
law."' 62 Furthermore, in translating nisi per legale judicium parium
suorum, yelper legem terrae in Chapter 39 of the Magna Charta, Lord
Coke stated that the phrase meant "unless it be by the lawful judgment,
that is verdict of his equals. . . or by the law of the land. '63 The Latin
word vel, however, may be translated either as "and" or as "or," and
the better opinion seems to be that, contrary to Lord Coke's opinion, it
should be translated to mean "and" in Chapter 39.1 Nevertheless,
these errors, if they are errors, clearly do not affect the meaning of due
61. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *318. See Jurow, supra note 48, at 278.
62. Professor Mcllwain states that in the year 1215 the word law, orlex, was sometimes
used to describe a mode of trial, but that it could also be used in a "wider" sense and this
wider sense was how it was used in Chapter 39. See Mcllwain, supra note 48, at 44-46. In
Mcllwain's opinion, "the demand of Chapter 39 was for a restoration of the 'good laws' of
an earlier time, and ... those good laws cannot be compressed into the narrow mold of the
ancient forms of judicial proof." Id. at 49. Professor Meyer concludes that "Lex terrae in
the Magna Charta ... meant a particular procedure." H. MEYER, supra note 48, at 130.
Professor Meyer goes on to state that "due process is any regular procedure established by
law, where it applies." Id. at 137. Meyer argues that Lord Coke was almost correct in
equating "by the law of the land" with "due process of law," because both were procedural
terms, the former referring to a particular procedure, the latter to any regular procedure. See
id. at 140. Lord Coke erred, however, in translating ';Der legem terrae" simply as "by the
law of the land" and then equating it with due process, which Lord Coke "identified with
procedural forms of the common law"; this made no sense, "because the meaning of the law
of the land in Coke's time was not the same as that of due process of law." Id. Professor
Jurow concluded that the statutes discussed in notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra
were not attempts to define law of the land in Chapter 39. They were attempts "to clarify
certain aspects of 'the law of the land' about which serious grievances had arisen"; due
process of law had a "much more specific" meaning than law of the land, the term "process"
referring to "those writs which summoned parties to appear in court, as well as those by
which execution of judgments was carried out." Jurow, supra note 48, at 271-72. Jurow's
conclusions seem correct. The statutes all appear to be aimed at securing a regularized procedure for a hearing on an individual's rights.
63. E. COKE, supra note 49, at 46; see text accompanying note 48 supra.
64. Professor Meyer, who with others views lex terrae in Chapter 39 as referring to a
particular mode of proof, argues that Coke's translation would permit "a deprivation of life,
liberty, and property simply by a judgment of equals without a right to answer to the accusation and to have a proof procedure." H. MEYER, supra note 48, at 138. Professor McIlwain,
who believed lex terrae had a broader meaning than a mere proof procedure, also concluded
that "and" is the better translation: "[E]ven with the wider meaning of lex, and would seem
the better reading, for there is no antithesis betweenjudiciumparium andper legem terrae.
The former prescribes the manner of application, the latter the law to be applied. They are
complimentary to each other, not alternative." Mcllwain, supra note 48, at 50. Professor
Mcllwain, however, also concluded that "and" was the proper reading even iflex terrae only
refers to proof procedure. See id.
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process in English law, although they are important as indicators of

Lord Coke's influence on the American colonies and states. Many of
the colonies and states had charters and constitutions with law of the
land clauses. The wording of these clauses varied, but most used the

word "or" to connect "judgment of his peers" with "by the law of the
land. 65 Such wording supports the notion that Lord Coke strongly
influenced the American interpretation of the clauses and explains the

translation of "law of the land" as "due process of law." 66 The meaning of "due process" remained basically the same from English law
through the American colonial period and the period prior to the ratifi-

cation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 The expressioi clearly meant
that a person had to be afforded an opportunity to be heard in defense
in a judicial proceeding before his life, liberty, or property could be
taken from him by the government. 68 The question pertinent to this
article is whether or not it meant more than this. That is, given the fact

that twentieth century cases impose "substantive" restrictions on state
choice-of-law authority through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,69 can the clause be read to support such

restrictions?
The English and colonial materials available generally do not tend
65. The colonial charters and constitutions are discussed in detail in Whitten II, supra
note 9, at 754-55.
66. See id. at 742,751-53,768-70. Thus, for example, Joseph Story, in his Commentaries
on the Constitutionofthe UnitedStates, published in 1833, stated that the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment "is but an enlargement of the language of the Magna Charta ....
Lord Coke says that these latter words ("by the law of the land") mean due process of law
....
" 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1789,
at 565-66 (5th ed. 1891). In 1858, the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "The words 'due
process of law', mean the law of the land, and are to be so understood in the constitution
. . . . Lord Coke construed the words 'law of the land', to mean dueprocessoflaw. Hence,
we sometimes find one phraseology used, and sometimes the other." Sears v. Cottrell, 5
Mich. 250, 253 (1858).
Numerous cases prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment held that law of
the land and due process were equivalent expressions and cited Lord Coke's SecondInstitute
as authority. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 276 (1855); cases cited in Whitten II, supra note 9, at 768 n.l 11. The early commentators agreed with this interpretation. See 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 13 (J. Gould 14th ed. 1896); 2 J. STORY, supra note 66, at 565-67. See also Whitten II,
supra note 9, at 751-53, 768-70.
67. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 754-55, 768-70, 772-92, 795-99.
68. See id. at 769-70, 795-98. Thus, Joseph Story stated that the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment "affirms the right of trial according to the process and proceedings of
the common law." J. STORY, supra note 66, at 567. Similarly, Daniel Webster argued in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819), that "[b]y
the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law, which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."
69. See text accompanying notes 10-46 supra.
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to indicate a basis for substantive choice-of-law limitations. 70 Subsequent to the ,ratification of the Constitution, however, there emerged a
large body of decisional law interpreting various law of the land and
due process clauses.7 Some of the cases articulated due process standards that clearly deserve the label "substantive." 7 2 These cases have
sometimes been offered as partial justification for the Supreme Court's
later protection of economic interests through the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.7 3 However, the cases must be scrutinized
closely before one concludes that they support a broad theory of "substantive" due process. The issue is whether or not the cases existed in
adequate numbers and were considered sufficiently authoritative to
form a part of the original, general understanding of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Ely has stated:
"[I]t should take more than occasional aberrational use to establish that
those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had an eccentric definition in mind." 74
The problem is complicated further by the fact that the pre-Fourteenth Amendment due process cases articulated very different kinds of
substantive standards. This problem requires that each standard be
evaluated separately, in order to determine whether or not it can be
said to be a legitimate part of the general understanding of due process
possessed by the Amendment's ratifiers. The different standards may
not simply be lumped together under the label "substantive due process" and the conclusion drawn that, in the aggregate, the cases justify
the imposition of any kind of substantive restrictions on state power
that the Supreme Court may devise. 75 Unless each substantive application can stand on its own, it cannot be deemed a part of the general
understanding of the clause.
It is also wise to keep in mind Justice Frankfurter's admonition
that "'substance' and 'procedure' are the same keywords to very different problems. Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure' represents the same
invariants. '' 76 This point is especially true in considering whether or
not to append the label "substantive' or "procedural" to a pre-Four70. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 738-55. But see id. at 752-53 (Hamilton's remarks,
discussed in text accompanying notes 135-40 infra).
71. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 755-804.
72. See id. at 770-71, 793-95.
73. See B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 41-46 (1980).
74. J. ELY, supra note 45, at 18.
75. As the discussion in text accompanying notes 76-207 infra will suggest, this is the
mistake I believe Professor Siegan makes in his analysis of the cases. See generally B. SIEGAN, supra note 73.
76. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
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teenth Amendment application of a due process or law of the land
clause. In one sense, all of the applications examined could be legitimately classified as "procedural," because all were derived from the
core principle that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without first being given an opportunity to defend in a judicial
proceeding."7 Nevertheless, it was clearly also true that some derivations of this principle were directly related to a guarantee of judicial
process, while others were quite remote from it. These remote applications of the core principle tend most to warrant the label "substantive,"
but by no means can all of these applications justifiably be considered a
part of the original, general understanding of due process. As the following discussion will indicate, only one of the "substantive" principles
articulated prior to the Fourteenth Amendment has roots sufficiently
anchored in the Amendment's context to be carried over into subsequent law. That principle forms the only legitimate basis upon which
the Supreme Court may limit state choice-of-law authority.
III.

The Pre-Fourteenth Amendment Context
of Due Process of Law

Indisputably, the most important feature of American constitutions is the doctrine of separation of powers.7 8 Many state charters and
constitutions contain explicit separation of powers clauses, as well as
law of the land or due process clauses.79 Indeed, the requirement of
due process of law is clearly an important separation of powers command in its own right. To the extent that the government cannot take a
person's life, liberty, or property without a judicial proceeding in which
he is afforded an opportunity to be heard in defense, substantial limitations exist upon executive and legislative power arbitrarily to deprive
individuals of their rights.
The doctrine of separation of powers in the United States, as contrasted with the English doctrine, operated in conjunction with law of
the land and due process clauses to produce "substantive" limitations
on legislative power, as well as limitations on the power of legislatures
to strip individuals of procedural rights. Lord Coke had written in his
Fourth Institute that the power of "parliament, for making of laws in
proceeding by bill. . . is so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be
77. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 793.
78. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of separation of powers in England and America, see M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
(1967).
79. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 746-55.
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confined either for causes or persons within any bounds."8 0 Blackstone, though conceding in the abstract the power of the people to "remove or alter the legislative when they find the legislative act contrary
to the trust reposed in them,"8 1 acknowledged the supreme power of
Parliament: "So long therefore as the English constitution lasts, we
may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and
without control." 2
As the doctrine of separation of powers was implemented in the
United States, however, limitations were placed on the powers of all
branches of government, including the legislative branch. In states
having separation of powers clauses in their constitutions, the doctrine
operated directly to produce certain kinds of "substantive" limits on
legislative power; but even in the absence of a specific separation of
powers clause, concepts of separation of powers often surfaced in decisions under law of the land or due process clauses. s3 The substantive
restrictions on legislative power imposed through these clauses were
also based on English sources. When Lord Coke defined the phraseper
legem terrae, he stated that "it is not said, legem & consuetudinem Regis
Angliae, lest it might be thought to bind the king only, norpopuliAngliae, lest it might be thought to bind them only, but that the law might
extend to all, it is saidper legem terrae."' s Blackstone defined municipal law as
a rule: not a transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform,
and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to
confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason,
does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation
of this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the
community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an
act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be
deemed high treason: this has permanency, uniformity, and
universality, and therefore is properly a rule. 5
80. E. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS 36 (1644).
81. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *161. See also J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT § 149, at 385 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1970).

82. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *161.
83. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 771-72. There seems to be no substantial disagreement that due process and law of the land clauses were designed to limit legislative as well as
judicial power in the American system. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, supra note 73, at 40-46. The
overwhelming evidence tending to prove that this limitation was so has not, therefore, been
reproduced here. For a full survey of that evidence, see Whitten II, supra note 9, at 770-95.
84. E. COKE, supra note 49, at 51.
85. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *44. See also J. LOCKE, supra note 81, § 142, at
381: "[The legislature is] to govern by promulgated establish"dLaws, not to be varied in
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Blackstone also insisted that municipal law had to be "'a rule prescribed'. . .. [because] a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the

legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can never
be properly a law. . . .All laws should be therefore made to commence infuturo ..... 86

Substantive limitations on legislative power under American law
of the land and due process clauses were derived from these statements
in two related ways. First, legislatures were held obligated to enact
only "general laws," rather than partial or particular ones, because the
latter were, in Blackstone's words, "spent upon" individuals and had
"no relation to the community in general"; consequently, they were
"rather a sentence than a law." 87 In other words, "partial" or "particular" laws were exercises of judicial power because they were adjudications, rather than laws. They violated due process and law of the land
clauses because they were legislative adjudications, and those clauses
required judicial proceedings before life, liberty, or property could be
taken from an individual.88 In its most limited form, this idea was and
still is uncontroverted: A legislature cannot adjudicate particular disputes between individuals.89 Nevertheless, some courts held that the
general law requirement of due process imposed broad restrictions on
the legislature's regulatory power by restricting the legislature's ability
to draw statutory classifications. 90 This broad judicial limitation on
legislative power surely deserved the name "substantive due process."
The second "substantive" limitation on legislative power derived
from the English context and enforced through law of the land and due
process clauses was a variation on this same theme, but it translated
into a proscription against retroactive lawmaking. Blackstone had insisted that municipal law, to be law, had to operate prospectively. 9 ' If a
legislature enacted a retrospective law, it was not operating within the
proper confines of its legislative function, and, therefore, the doctrine of
separation of powers was violated.9" Law of the land and due process
clauses were similarly violated by such legislation, because it was considered a kind of judicial act.93 The reason was again related to Blackparticular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and
the Country Man at Plough."
86. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *45-46.
87. Id. at *44.
88. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 741-43.
89. See id. at 794.
90. See id. at 794-95; text accompanying notes 102-121 infra.
91. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
92. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 771-72.
93. See id. at 772.
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stone's definition of municipal law: An act of the legislature directly
confiscating the property of a particular person was a "sentence," an
adjudication, not a law,94 and it violated due process limitations because it was a legislative adjudication.95 It was only a short step from
this to the conceptualistic conclusion that a general act96 having the
effect of directly divesting individuals of property rights that had
"vested" under prior law was also a violation of due process, because
the taking of rights occurred without the intervention of judicial process.9 7 The emphasis in this kind of case was placed on the idea that

there had been no violation of a "standing" or, "preexisting" law that
would justify the taking.98 This objection clearly translated the proscription against direct divestiture into one against ex postfacto lawmaking.99 In the American cases, Blackstone's objections against direct
takings and expostfacto laws were integrated to produce the principle
that retroactive laws constituted judicial actions undertaken by the legislature, which were consequently violative of due process.
An examination of the cases will illustrate how the "partial law"
and nonretroactivity limitations operated. It will also demonstrate the
extent to which they may be considered a part of the "general understanding" of due process at the time the Fourteenth Amendmint was
ratified.
A.

The Partial Law Limitation

Although a substantial number of cases prior to the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment recognized that due process of law forbade
a legislature from passing "partial" or "particular" laws, only a few
states applied this restriction broadly enough to restrict the regulatory
power of the legislature by limiting its ability to draw statutory classifications. The general law requirement had its American origin in the
argument of Daniel Webster before the Supreme Court in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward."° Webster's definition of law of the
land was later cited in many state cases. He argued that partial laws, as
opposed to general ones, violated the law of the land requirement:
94. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
95. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 772.
96. In other words, one that applied to the community at large, or a group within the
community engaged in a specific business, profession, or activity, as opposed to an act directed at a particular individual or case.
97. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 772.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a
law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is,
that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society. Every thing which may pass under the form of an
enactment, is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land.
If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts
of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees, and forfeitures, in all possible forms, would be the law of
the land.' 0 '
Despite the popularity of this statement in the state courts, only a
few decisions seem to have applied the general law requirement
broadly enough to restrict legislative regulatory power in any significant way. The largest number of cases to this effect were decided in
Tennessee. In Waily's' Heirs v. Kennedy, 1°2 the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment, asserting title to land as a reserve under treaties of
1817 and 1819 with the Cherokee Indians. The defendant relied on an
act of the Tennessee Legislature, passed in 1827, which provided that if
the defendant proved that the suit was prosecuted on a contingent interest or in trust for anyone other than the person in whose name the
suit was brought, the plaintiffs recovery would be barred. The defendant established to the satisfaction of the jury that the suit was being
prosecuted for persons other than the plaintiff's lessors. The plaintiff
subsequently appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, contending
that the act was unconstitutional as a partial act. 10 3 The court agreed,
101. Id. at 581-82. "[N~o definition [of the terms "due process of law" and "law of the
land"] perhaps, is more often quoted than that given by Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth
College Case . . . ." T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 353

(1868). Note that Webster's definition also provides support for the retroactivity limitation
of due process of law, discussed in section III (B) of the text infra. Despite the popularity, in
one degree or another, of the general law requirement among the state courts, the Supreme
Court of the United States never adopted it as a definition of due process of law in the Fifth
Amendment. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857); Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
102. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554 (1831).
103. In Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 259 (1829), the Tennessee Supreme Court
had considered the constitutionality of an act of the legislature passed to provide for "the
mode by which the holders of the notes of the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, at Nashville,
and the Fayetteville Tennessee Bank, may, on their refusal to pay the same, recover judgment." Id. at 262. The act was challenged as a partial act. See id. at 263. The court upheld
the act against this challenge, drawing a distinction betweeen "acts of the legislature which
come in aid of a remedy and such acts as impose clogs and restrictions upon remedies existing at the time the contract was made," the former being constitutional while the latter are
not. Id. at 265.
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stating: "The act of 1827 is peculiarly partial. It is limited in its operation to a comparatively small section of the state, and to a very few
individuals claiming a very small portion of the section of the country
referred to."'"

The act was invalidated despite the court's concession

that the legislature had a valid concern in preventing the manufacturing of evidence for the purpose of fraudulently establishing rights to
reserves that the Indians never possessed. 10 5 The court felt that any

other interpretation of the law of the land clause carried a potential
danger of minority oppression and thus was antithetical to the clause's
purpose.

10 6

Another illustration of the Tennessee approach is found in Bank of
the State v. Cooper.0 7 The Tennessee Legislature created a special

court for the disposition of suits commenced by the state bank against
its officers and their sureties and against persons who had overdrawn
their accounts. The act designated three existing judges by name to sit
on the court and provided that the court was to be supreme in its sphere

of action, with no appeal from its decisions. The bank brought suit
under this act against one of its employees and his sureties. The suit
was brought on the employee's bond after he had embezzled bank
funds. The defendants pleaded that the court was without jurisdiction
over the suit because, among other things, the Act setting up the court

was a partial law. All three judges of the special court agreed, each
writing a separate opinion.
Judge Green stated that the law of the land clause was designed
"to restrain the legislature from enacting any law affecting injuriously

the rights of any citizen, unless at the same time the rights of all others
in similar circumstances were equally affected by it."'1 8 Judge Peck
observed that "the act relates to the few specially named in it; the rules
by which we are to be governed are not those common to the rest of the
104. Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 556.
105. Id.
106. "The part of the constitution referred to was intended to secure to weak and unpopular minorities and individuals equal rights with the majority, who, from the nature of our
government, exercise the legislative power. Any other construction of the constitution
would set up the majority in the government as a many-headed tyrant, with capacity and
power to oppress the minority at pleasure, by odious laws binding on the latter." Id. at 557.
Though the court stated this as its concern, it had previously conceded that the actual operation of the act would adversely affect the "great body of the people," as well as the few
individuals at which it was aimed. See id. at 556-57.
107. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599 (Special Ct. at Nashville 1831). Cf.Hazen v. Union Bank, 33
Tenn. (1 Sneed) 115 (1853) (charter of Union Bank, allowing it to charge 7% interest when
generally permissible rate was 6%, upheld against challenges that it was a partial law; act of
incorporation is a contract, unlike an ordinary law).
108. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 606.

Summer 19821

CHOICE OF LAW AND DUE PROCESS

community; . . . under these circumstances, is the law of the land
likely to be afforded to the defendants?"' 109 Judge Kennedy stated that
the assignment of judges by name caused the act to operate on the
judges individually, rather than on the courts of which they were

judges, contrary to Blackstone's "fundamental principle" that municipal law "must be 'permanent, uniform and universal.' " 1 Judge Kennedy also stated that the state's law of the land clause was violated
because the act contemplated suit against "particular debtors to this

bank before a tribunal where no other person can sue or be sued, and
to have their rights ascertained and settled by rules that apply to no
other debtors of this institution, nor to any other member of the community."" Numerous other Tennessee decisions applied this broad
general law limitation to restrict the regulatory power of the legisla13

ture, 1 2 setting up a basic principle against discriminatory laws.'

Iowa also indicated a willingness to apply the general law restriction broadly. In Reed v. Wright,"I4 the plaintiff sued to recover a tract
located within what was known as the "half-breed" lands. To show
title, he offered in evidence judgments, executions on the judgments,
and sheriff's deeds from sales made pursuant to the executions. The
defendant's objection to this evidence was sustained, and the plaintiff
109. Id. at 614.
110. Id. at 617.
Ill. Id. at 619-20.
112. See State v. Burnett, 53 Tenn. (6 Heisk.) 186 (1871) (statute directed at particular
administrator of deceased tax collector declared invalid as partial law; also, statute invalid
because it undertook to donate to certain individuals in county covered by the act amounts
paid by them into state treasury in a particular year, without extending its benefits to other
individuals in other counties who had made similar payments); Mayor of Alexandria v.
Dearmon, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 103 (1854) (statute requiring sheriff of a particular county to
hold elections declared invalid as a partial law); Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 482 (1842)
(statute providing penalties for embezzlement by employees of the Union Bank of Tennessee declared invalid as a partial law); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59 (1836)
(statute authorizing guardians of certain infants to sell tract of land for purpose of paying
debts of infants' ancestor violated clause of constitution vesting judicial power in courts and
law of the land clause, the latter being violated because the statute was a partial rather than
a general law). Note that several of the cases cited, e.g., State v. Burnett and Jones' Heirs v.
Perry, come very close to the narrow view of the general law requirement discussed in the
text accompanying notes 123-133 infra, in that they approach a situation in which the legislature is adjudicating an individual case by statute. The principle being articulated in the
cases is best viewed, however, as a much broader limitation upon discriminatory laws of all
sorts. See the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 102-111 supra, and others such
as Mayor of Alexandria v. Dearmon and Budd v. State. The narrower restriction against
adjudicating individual cases by statute, of course, was encompassed within this broader
one.
113. See note 112supra.
114. 2 Greene 15 (Iowa 1849).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:851

appealed. The judgment, executions, and sales were pursuant to certain acts of the Wisconsin and Iowa territorial legislatures, which established special procedures for the settlement of titles to the half-breed
lands. The procedures involved the appointment of three commissioners to report on the titles to the district court of the county in which the
lands were located. All persons claiming title to the lands had to file a
written notice of their claim with the clerk of the district court. The
commissioners were to take testimony on the validity of the claims. After the commissioners reported to the district court, the court was obligated to render judgment for the claimants at the next succeeding term
in accordance with the report, unless exceptions were filed to the report
by the fourth day of the term. The court had exclusive jurisdiction over
these matters. The commissioners were to be paid a fee for their services, and they were authorized to commence an action for these fees in
the district court against the owners of the half-breed lands. The court
was authorized to enter judgment against the owners for the fees and
expenses of the commissioners plus costs, and the judgment was to constitute a lien upon the lands. In this case, the plaintiff's title was derived from an execution sale pursuant to a judgment in favor of the
commissioners for such fees, expenses, and costs. Pursuant to one of
the acts at issue in this case, notice by publication had been given to the
defendants for eight weeks in the Iowa TerritorialGazelle, designating
them simply as "owners of the half-breed lands lying in Lee6
County."' 5 Trial of the suits was to the court, rather than to a jury." 1
The court declared that the act violated provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, which guaranteed the inhabitants of the territory "judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law" and
provided "that no man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but
by the judgment of his peers or the laws of the land.""I7 Relying on
Blackstone's definition of law as a "rule, not a sudden transient order
from a superior. . . but something permanent, uniform and universal," 8 Lord Coke's equation of law of the land in Magna Charta with
9 and Webster's definition of law of the land as a
due process of 2law,'
"general law," ° the court concluded that
[t]he judgment of the court upon their report is to settle the title
to more than one hundred thousand acres of valuable land, not
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 17.
Id.at 16-17, 24-25.
Id.at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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by any proceeding according to the course of the common law,
not by service of process, by which the parties could have a day
in court, not by a general law of the land, operating upon the
whole community alike, but by a special
and limited act, violat121
ing all of these valuable safeguards.
Only Tennessee and Iowa decisions applied the general law restriction of due process broadly enough to limit the legislative power to
draw classifications; 22 numerous cases decided in other parts of the
country applied the restriction more narrowly. These cases either re-

fused to restrict legislative power to draw classifications or applied the
general law limitation in contexts where the legislature was attempting
to adjudicate an individual case by statutory enactment.
In Alabama, for example, an 1859 decision upheld the power of
the legislature to regulate liquor sales."

The legislature had prohib-

ited the sale of intoxicating liquor within five miles of the City of
Greensboro. The court sustained this regulation, stating that law of the
121. Id. at 25. The court elaborated on the reasons why the act should be invalidated as
a partial law: "The power assumed by the legislature in this act, if sustained by the courts,
would lead to the most fearful consequences, as it would enable them at will, by special and
limited laws, to settle all controversies of title, and to bring about this object the property of
one person could be taken against his consent, and given to another ....
"Laws affecting life, liberty and property must be general in their application, operating
upon the entire community alike . . . . The life, liberty and property of one citizen rest
upon the same legal foundation as those of another, and if these are taken from him, it must
be by a law which operates upon all alike." Id. at 26-27. See also Mason v. Messenger, 17
Iowa 261, 270-72 (1864).
122. There was also dicta in James v. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 250, 252 (1847), suggesting that
due process required general laws binding on all members of the community, rather than
partial or private laws affecting only the rights of private individuals or classes of individuals. However, the case upheld a law authorizing summary judgments and seemed unconcerned with anything that could remotely be considered "substantive." Similarly, in Mayor
of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841), the court interpreted a previous case, In re Dorsey, 7
Port. 293 (Ala 1838), as having invalidated a statute on the grounds that it was a "partial
law"; however, it is clear that the two judges in Dorsey who found the law unconstitutional
did so on other grounds. The law had imposed a duelling oath on attorneys as a qualification for practicing in the state courts. Refusal to take the oath resulted in disqualification
from practice. The judges who invalidated the law saw this as an attempt to determine guilt
without a judicial trial and thus considered it violative of due process. See id.at 367, 381.
The statute in Dorsey was therefore partial only in the sense that it involved a legislative
attempt at adjudication, and cannot be taken as authority for the broad application of the
general law requirement. In Exparte Woods, 3 Ark. 532, 536 (1841), the court stated that
the Arkansas law of the land clause meant "the general law; a law which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." The case,
however, considered the judgment of a lower court rendered without service of process to be
invalid, and it seems clear that the law of the land clause was violated because of the lack of
an opportunity to be heard. Thus, the quotation might refer only to the hearing aspect of
Webster's quotation.
123. Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216 (1859).
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land and due process clauses were substantially identical and were
designed to prevent legislative confiscation of property without a
trial. 124 However, the court did not consider that this prevented legislative regulation of property:
In every well ordered State, property is held subject to the tacit
condition, that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights
of others, or the interests of the community. Such injurious uses
of property may be prevented by such regulations and restraints
as the legislature may think proper to impose ....125

Michigan also adopted a narrow interpretation of the general law
restriction. In Sears v. Cottrell,2 6 a tax law provided that the state

treasurer could levy and collect the taxes of a person by distress and
sale of any goods in that person's possession. If someone else's goods
were sold to pay the debtor's taxes, a remedy was provided that person
against the debtor in the form of an action in assumpsit. In Sears, the

plaintiff's lumber, while in the possession of a miller, was sold to pay
the miller's taxes. The plaintiff sued the treasurer, who defended under
the act; the plaintiff then challenged the act as unconstitutional under
the state's due process clause. 27 The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the constitutionality of the act, stating that due process and law of

the land were equivalent phrases. Law of the land meant laws that
were "general in their operation, and that affect the rights of all alike;

and not a special act of the legislature, passed to affect the rights of an
individual against his will, and in a way in which the same rights of
other persons are not affected by existing laws."'12

The court, however,

also stated: "The law in question is not one of this [latter] class. It was
not designed or intended to operate on the rights of the plaintiff, or any
other individual,as such."'129 From the reference in these statements to
124. Id. at 236-41.
125. Id. at 243-44. The court reserved judgment on whether or not an absolute prohibition of liquor sales would violate due process. Id. at 242.
126. 5 Mich. 250 (1858).
127. Id. at 252-53.
128. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
129. Id. (emphasis added). See also Parsons v. Russell, I1 Mich. 113 (1863), in which the
court stated: "Whatever may be the difficulty of defining [due process of law] ...

when

sought to be applied to other proceedings, when used in relation to those of ajudicialcharacter, it is evidently, and has been so universally held, intended to secure to the citizen the
right to a trial according to the forms g of law of the questions of his liability and responsibility, before his person or his property shall be condemned. Judicial action is in such cases
imperatively required, and 'implies and includes actor, reus,judex-regularallegations, opportunity to answer, and trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings.'
While we adopt the common law, or, to speak more accurately, so long as we recognize and
submit to it, we recognize and adopt the fundamental principle that no man shall be a party
and judge in his own case; that if tried, it shall be by his peers, and if deprived of liberty or
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laws aimed at individuals, it strongly appears that the general law limitation of due process did not operate in Michigan to prevent the legislature from drawing classifications. Rather, the Michigan court
apparently considered the requirement merely to be one of preventing
30
the legislature from adjudicating individual cases by statute.
In Pennsylvania, there was an eloquent statement of the purposes
of the general law requirement in a case that applied the requirement
to narrow facts. In Erine'sAppeal,13 1 a testator's will had provided
that his lands should not be sold during the life of his son, Daniel, who
was to be supported from the rents. After Daniel's death the lands
were to be sold and the profits divided among the testator's remaining
children. Daniel obtained an act of the Pennsylvania Assembly directing the Orphan's Court to appoint a trustee and order the sale of
the lands and investment of the proceeds. The Orphan's Court refused
to enforce the act on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and
Daniel appealed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the act unconstitutional under the state due process clause. In explaining the reasons for the general law requirement, the court stated:
[W]hen, in the exercise of proper legislative powers, general laws
are enacted, which bear or may bear on the whole community, if
they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, the
whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a
voice potential. And that is the great security for just and fair
legislation.
But when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws
are enacted affecting their property, without summons or notice,
at the instigation of an interested party, who is to stand up for
them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and injustice, or
where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power?
They have no refuge but in the courts, the only secure
32 place for
determining conflicting rights by due course of law.'
property, it shall be by impartial judicial authority, after a trial and judgment under general
laws." Id. at 120.
130. In Mississippi there was a cryptic statement in a case of narrow application. In
Noonan v. State, 5 Miss. (1 S. & M.) 562 (1844), the defendant in a criminal case challenged
the act under which he was indicted as a violation of the state due process clause. The
grounds were that the act was in derogation of the common law, which he argued had been
made a part of the constitution at the time of its adoption and was thus beyond alteration.
The court rejected this, stating that the provisions of the Mississippi Constitution requiring
that the rights of persons shall be "'ascertained by law"' and protected "'by the common
law"' were designed only to condemn legislation in criminal cases that was partial and
particular, rather than equal and general. Id. at 573.
131. 16 Pa. 256 (1851).
132. Id. at 268.
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This language is broad, but the court's concern was narrow. The
reference to the need for "summons and notice" before a deprivation of
property refers to the core due process concept of an opportunity to be
heard in defense. The court's main concern was to prevent adjudication of individual rights by the legislature, clearly a justifiable, nonsubstantive application of due process. Thus the court had stated earlier
that the legislature had attempted to wrest the property of the remaining children away from them "by a summary
process, unknown in any
1 33
court of justice, by an exparte statute."
On the whole, the pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions applying
the general law component of due process provide no justification for
reading a broad substantive restriction on state power into the Amendment. The requirement was seldom applied to restrict legislative power
to draw classifications. The most frequent applications were to prevent
"direct" deprivations of property by legislative action either adjudicating rights by statute or (what amounted to the same thing) providing
for forfeiture of rights upon determinations made by state officials
without a judicial determination of liability or guilt. The broader application of the general law concept evidenced in the Tennessee decisions did not command general support. Consequently, it must be
considered "abberational." 34 Insofar as the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context determines meaning, therefore, the broader application
cannot be considered a part of the general understanding of due process of law at the time of ratification.
B. The Nonretroactivity Limitation
Although the general law concept provides no basis for broad restrictions on legislative regulatory power, there is far greater support in
the pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions for a requirement that legislative acts not operate retroactively. The source of this requirement is
much the same as that of the general law concept, but with a few additional twists. Legislatures could not directly take life, liberty, or property from an individual. A taking, therefore, had to be accompanied by
a judicial proceeding. It followed that a statute adjudicating a particular individual's rights violated due process, as did one providing for a
forfeiture of rights upon the occurrence of certain events without an
intervening judicial determination of whether or not the events had oc133. Id.
134. See J. ELY, supra note 45, at 18. See also T. COOLEY, supra note 101, at 389-97
(discussing unequal and partial legislation). Cooley gives many examples of such legislation
that were not held to violate due process.
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curred. Additionally, a statute enacted to deprive persons of life, liberty, or property, even if general and prospective in some of its
applications, could operate as a direct legislative taking to the extent
that it also operated retroactively to divest individuals of rights acquired under preexisting law. Such statutes were often considered unconstitutional violations of due process of law. The rationale of the
cases so holding was that a requirement of judicial process implied that
the legislature could not by the indirect device of a retroactive statute
practically avoid a judicial determination of an individuars liability.
The direct divestiture prohibition had roots extending back to
preconstitutional concepts of due process. In 1787, for instance, the
New York Legislature passed an "act concerning the Rights of Citizens
of this State," which provided, in pertinent part, the following:
Second, That no Citizen of this State shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his or her Freehold, or Liberties, or FreeCustoms; or outlawed, or exiled, or condemned, or otherwise destroyed, but by lawful judgment of his or her Peers; or by due
Process of Law.
Third, That no Citizen of this State shall be taken or imprisoned
for any Offence, upon Petition or Suggestion, unless it be by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful Men of the same
Neighborhood where such Deeds be done, in due Manner, or by
due Process of Law.
Fourth, That no Person shall be put to answer without Presentment before Justices, or Matter of Record, or due Process of Law,
according to the Law of the Land; and if any Thing be done
to
35
the Contrary, it shall be void in Law and holden for error.
After this statute was enacted, the New York Legislature passed
"An Act for Regulating Elections," which disqualified certain persons
from holding offices of trust in the state. A proposed Senate amendment to the act would have added to the categories of persons disqualified "owner or owners of . . . privateers," along with "captain[s],
135. Law of Jan. 26, 1787, 2 Jones & Varick 1 (New York Laws 1787-1789), reprinted in
H. MEYER, supra note 48, at 142 n.1. Professor Meyer observed that the "Act copied almost
verbatim Coke's translation of chapter 29, 9 Henry III (1225), and certain medieval statutes
quoted by Coke in explanation of this clause. However, a few important changes were made
evidently to make it more understandable. The New York Act uses 'due process of law'
instead of 'the law of the land' in places where this is a translation of the term lex terrae,
meaning procedure, and 'the law of the land' is used in a context where it makes sense in
accordance with its modem meaning.
"Since 1821 every New York Constitution has contained both terms: the law of the
land or the judgment of peers in connection with rights of citizens, and the due process
clause in connection with procedural rights which apply to all persons." Id. at 143.
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leutenant[s], or master[s]."' 136 Alexander Hamilton spoke in opposition of this amendment, stating:
In one article of [the Constitution] it is said no man shall be disfranchised or deprived of any right he enjoys under the constitution, but by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.
Some gentlemen hold that the law of the land will include an act
of the legislature. But Lord Coke, that great luminary of the law,
in his comment upon a similar clause, in Magna Charta, interprets the law of the land to mean presentment and indictment,
and process of outlawry, as contradistinguished from trial by
jury. But if there were any doubt upon the constitution, the bill
of rights [referring to the "act concerning the Rights of Citizens
of this State"] enacted in this very session removes it. It is there
declared that, no man shall be disfranchised or deprived of any
right, but by dueprocessof law, or the judgment of his peers. The
words "dueprocess"have a precise technical import, and are only
applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts ofjustice;
they can never be referred to an act of legislature.
Are we willing then to endure the inconsistency of passing a
bill of rights, and committing a direct violation of it in the same
session? In short, are we
137 ready to destroy its foundations at the
moment they are laid?
Hamilton's remarks were directed at least in part to the retroactive
effect of the law. 138 He had earlier observed that the operation of the
amendment "would be very extensive; it would include almost every
man in the city, concerned in navigation during the war."' 139 The proposed Senate amendment' 4° thus denied due process to individuals because it was a direct, legislative taking of a right without the
intervention of a court to adjudicate liability under a law existing at the
time the relevant act was committed. The right was taken by the very
act passed to impose the penalty, with no opportunity given to the indi136. See IV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: JANUARY 1787-MAY 1788, at 3435 n.1 (H. Syrett & J.Cooke eds. 1962) [hereinafter cited as HAMILTON].
137. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis in original).
138. Hamilton's objections may also have been directed to procedures for determining
whether or not someone was an owner of a privateer without judicial process. For example,
another proposed section of the Act authorized election inspectors to require an oath of
certain persons. Refusal to take the oath would have resulted in disfranchisement. See id. at
22-24. It has been previously noted that this sort of provision has been held to be a violation
of due process on the grounds that guilt or liability was being determined without a judicial
trial. See the discussion of In re Dorsey, supra note 119. See also text accompanying notes
145-47 infra. Hamilton's objection may have been similar, but his concern about the Act's
applicability to blameless patriots suggests that retroactivity was his primary concern.
139. HAMILTON, supra note 136, at 35. See also id. at 36-37.
140. Hamilton obviously viewed at least parts of the rest of the statute to be unconstitutional on the same grounds, as he "lamented" the fact that the legislature had already violated the "act concerning the Rights of Citizens" to a certain degree. See id. at 36.
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vidual to take himself out of its operation by tailoring his future conduct to its terms. It follows that any retroactive law that takes life,
liberty, or property will constitute a direct legislative taking or adjudication violative of due process.
In addition to such enlightening legislative debate, numerous preFourteenth Amendment judicial decisions adopted the view that a direct legislative divestiture violated due process. A substantial number
of those cases also involved clear prohibitions against retroactive
legislation.
UnitedStates. In DredScott v. Sandford,14 1 Chief Justice Taney in
his opinion stated:
An act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or
brought his property into a particular Territory of the United
States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could
.hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. 4
Although the Missouri Compromise, which the Court invalidated
in Dred Scott, operated prospectively, Justice Taney's due process objection was quite similar to a retroactivity objection. His objection
seemed to be that a person who performs an innocent act, 143 such as
traveling with his property into a territory, should not have his property
taken from him as a consequence of that act. Such a consequence was
similar in some respects, though not identical, to the kind of direct legislative taking involved in a retroactive statute, which also "punished"
innocent acts. 144
141. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
142. Id. at 450.
143. It is not at all clear, however, why the act was considered "innocent," since a slaveholder who was deprived of his property would have to have first violated the law by deliberately taking a slave into territory declared free by the Missouri Compromise. This seems a
clear case of prospective operation. See D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 383
(1978), (describing Justice Taney's logic as "somewhat muddled" on this point). See also C.
SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES: VOLUME V, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 592-630 (1974).
144. Cf. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

390-91 (1978) (Justice Taney's opinion suggests that Congress had no power to interfere with
"vested" rights).
Even to the extent (which is far from clear) that Justice Taney's due process opinion can
be deemed authority for a nonretroactivity interpretation of due process, it may not have
had much persuasive impact on the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: "The first
clause of the first section of that amendment was framed to overcome the part of DredScott
relating to citizenship. The due process definition in Taney's opinion was not affected, but
carried little weight as part of a discredited opinion." B. SIEGAN, supra note 73, at 41.
See also Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), in which the Court held a
retroactive act of Congress unconstitutional as a violation of the article I, § 9 prohibition
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Alabama. Another decision imposing a limit on legislative power

to take property without judicial proceedings was In re Dorsey.145 In
that case, Dorsey contended that an act of the Alabama Legislature
imposing a duelling oath as a prerequisite to practicing law before the
state's courts was unconstitutional. The court held, by a majority of
two to one, that the oath was a violation of the state's "due course of

law" provision. The majority felt that the act was a legislative attempt
to determine guilt without trial, in that refusal to take the oath resulted
in automatic disqualification from practice. 146 In this way, the act involved a direct legislative adjudication or taking of property, even
though it operated prospectively. 147
148
Arkansas. A similar case arose in Arkansas. In Rison v. Farr,
the state constitution set qualifications for voting. The plaintiff met all

of these qualifications, but was denied the right to vote because he re-

fused to take an oath affirming that he had not voluntarily borne arms
against the United States or Arkansas, nor aided the Confederate authorities, since April 18, 1864. The Supreme Court of Arkansas invalidated the statute under a portion of the constitution setting
against bills of attainder and expostfacto laws. The Court observed that the rights involved
could only be taken after an opportunity to be heard was afforded, something not present in
Garland See 71 U.S. at 378. The most important issue in the case, however, was whether or
not the act of Congress, which imposed a test oath as a qualification for practice before
United States courts, actually imposed a penalty, a requirement for bringing the statute
within the prohibition of article I, § 9. If it had not been held to do so, the only provision
left that might have invalidated the act would have been the due process clause, interpreted
to prevent retroactive statutes depriving persons of vested rights. Yet the Court did not rely
on the due process clause, and although counsel for petitioner made an argument based on
the Fifth Amendment--Le., that the act violated the Amendment by compelling petitioner to
be a witness against himself-the argument contained no due process component. 71 U.S. at
368-70. It seems that if the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment had been generally
understood to prohibit retroactive laws divesting rights, an argument would have been made
based on the clause, to safeguard against the possibility that the Court would not interpret
the act as one that imposed penalties. On the other hand, petitioner did rely on In re Dorsey
in a general way, see id. at 343-44, and Dorsey was clearly a due process case. See note 119
supra; text accompanying notes 145-47 infra. Moreover, the Court had also relied on Dorsey, again in a general way, in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 332 (1866), a
case invalidating a retroactive Missouri statute under the article I, § 10, prohibition against
state acts of attainder and expostfacto laws. Thus, though the absence of a due process
argument or holding in Garlandposes obstacles to a theory that the Fifth Amendment was
generally understood to prohibit retroactive statutes, the significance of the omission is far
from clear. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 120, 134 (1877), in which a clearly specious due process retroactivity argument was made and was rejected by the Supreme Court.
145. 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838).
146. See id. at 367, 381.
147. See note 122 supra.
148. 24 Ark. 161 (1865).
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qualifications for voters. The court also extensively discussed legislative power under the constitution. It concluded that the legislature
could not enact, apply, and execute the law, because to do so would
violate the constitution's separation of powers clause and its law of the
land clause, which the court interpreted to require due process of
law.'49 Because the act did not require judicial proceedings to determine guilt, it violated the due process prohibition against direct legislative takings, even though it was general and prospective.
California. In Sherman v. Buick,' 50 the plaintiff sued for trespass
to his land, and the defendant justified the trespass under a statute providing for the establishment of "private" roads. The plaintiff asserted
that the statute was unconstitutional in that the legislature did not have
the power to take one person's property and give it to another, even
when compensation was provided. The court agreed that the legislature had no such power, stating that article I, section 8, of the state
constitution provided that no man could be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, and due process meant "something more than mere legislation."'' Clearly, the court's statement refers to the general prohibition against direct legislative takings, though
no retroactivity question was involved.
Illinois. In McDaniel v. Correll,'52 certain nonresidents were
served by publication in an action to set aside a will. Under a statute
prevailing at the time the suit was commenced, process had to be issued
and returned unserved before the nonresidents could be served by publication. This had not been done, but the court nevertheless decreed
the will void, thus depriving the nonresidents of their legacies under it.
An act of the Illinois Legislature, operating retroactively, had declared
proceedings such as this one valid, and the issue was the constitutionality of this act.' 53 The Illinois Supreme Court declared the act invalid,
stating:
If we assume the act to be valid, then the legacies, which before
belonged to the legatees, have now ceased to be theirs, and this
result has been brought about by this legislative act alone. The
effect of the act upon them is precisely the same as f it had declared,in direct terms, that the legacies bequeathedby this will to
149. See id. at 166-76.
150. 32 Cal. 241 (1867).
151. Id. at 250 (wherein the court pointed out that statute in question actually provided
for public, rather than private, roads, and thus legislation was constitutional).
152. 19 IM.226 (1857).
153. See id. at 226-28.
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these defendants should not go to them, but should descend to the
heirs at law ofthe testator,accordingto our law of descent. This it
will not be pretended that they could do directl, and they had no
more authority to do it indirectl, by makingproceedings binding
upon them which were void in law.

In the quoted passage, the relationship between a direct legislative taking of property and a taking by retroactive law is clearly portrayed; this
relationship was also demonstrated in other Illinois decisions. 155
Maryland. In Regents of the University of Marylandv. Williams,5 6
the regents had been incorporated under several acts of the legislature.

Subsequently, the legislature passed an act abolishing the old corporation, so that a board of trustees composed of different persons might be
appointed under a new corporate name and the assets of the old corporation transferred to the new corporation. The Supreme Court of
Maryland held that this act violated both the separation of powers
clause and the law of the land clause of the Maryland Bill of Rights.
According to the court, the act amounted to an exercise of judicial

power, because a sentence of dissolution was strictly a judicial act for
some delinquency ascertained in proceedings at law. Law of the land

meant due process of law, which in turn meant the general law, already
prescribed and existing as a rule of civil conduct, to be administered by

the courts. An act that affected and exhausted itself on a particular
person's rights was an adjudication rather than a law. 7 From the dis154. Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added). But ef.Walpole v. Elliot, 18 Ind. 258 (1862) (court
found that retrospective, curative legislation validated court holding that would have been
void without the legislation).
155. For example, in Ross v. Irving, 14 I11. 171 (1852), the plaintiff was successful in an
action in ejectment, and commissioners were appointed to assess the value of improvements
that had been made on the land. The appointment was made pursuant to a statute giving
adverse possessors compensation for improvements under certain circumstances. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of this statute on the ground, among others, that it violated the state law of the land clause. The court agreed that the legislature did not have the
power to take one person's property and give it to another, with or without compensation,
but felt this was not the effect of the statute. Also, because the statute was enacted long
before the improvements were made, it could not be deemed unconstitutional as a retrospective law. The clear implication was, therefore, that this would not have been so if the law
had been enacted after the fact. Accord Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 589, 591 (1854)
("The framers of the Magna Charta, and of the constitutions of the United States and of the
state, never intended to modify, abridge or destroy the police powers of government. They
only prohibited their exercise by ex postfacto laws, and regulated the mode of trial for
offenses."). See also Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 384 (1857) (court held that if legislature
directly reached property or vested rights of citizen of the state by providing for their forfeiture or transfer to another without trial and judgment in the courts, it would violate the state
constitution's separation of powers and law of the land clauses).
156. 9 G. & J. 365 (Md. 1838).
157. See id.at 412.
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cussion of the general law requirement in the preceding subsection, one
can see that the court in Williams was applying the noncontroversial
aspect of that requirement. It is also clear, however, that the objectionable act in Williams operated retroactively to divest rights previously
conferred by the legislature. This illustrates that the objections to partial and retroactive laws could coincide in the due process theory of the
day, and the reference to an already prescribed rule of civil conduct
demonstrates
that retroactivity was a key concern of the court's
1 8
decision. 5 9 the plaintiff's right of action
Massachusetts. In Ho/den v. James,"
was barred by a statute of limitations. The plaintiff petitioned the legislature for relief, and the legislature passed an act suspending the statute
in the plaintiff's case. The Massachusetts court invalidated this statute
under a state constitutional provision guaranteeing every citizen protection "in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to
standing laws."' 6 The court indicated that the legislature could not
prescribe a judgment for the courts to render, as that would be an "exercise of judicial power by the legislative department of government in
violation of the express provisions of the constitution."'61 The peculiar
wording of the Massachusetts constitutional provision prevents Holden
from being direct authority for a nonretroactivity due process interpretation; however, the case is similar to others in its view of legislative
power to adjudicate individual disputes, the concept from which the
nonretroactivity principle was derived.

Michigan. In Price v. Hopkin,162 the Michigan Legislature passed
an act shortening the period of limitations within which actions for the
recovery of lands might be brought. The Supreme Court of Michigan
held that the act could not be applied to rights of action that had accrued prior to its effective date, at least not without giving the plaintiff a
reasonable time within which to bring suit after the passage of the act.
A statute that failed to give such a reasonable time period, said the
court, "would be a palpable violation of the constitutional provision
that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of
158. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 452-53 (1852) (court approved constitutionality of legislative divorce, but indicated that legal consequences flowing from divorce had to be left to courts; thus, had legislature attempted to deal with matters of property
in divorce act, it would have been exercising judicial power).
159. 11 Mass. 396 (1814).
160. Id. at 402 (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 396.
162. 13 Mich. 318 (1865).
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Minnesota. Baker v. Kelley'" was an action in ejectment, in defense to which the defendant offered a tax deed. To rebut this defense,
the plaintiff offered to show that the land covered by the deed had not
been offered for sale in the manner prescribed by statute. The defendant maintained that the plaintiff was barred by an 1862 statute from
presenting such evidence, because the suit -had not been commenced
within one year after the tax deed was recorded. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota concluded that the 1862 statute was unconstitutional
under the state due process clause. The court stated that due process
meant that when a person acquired rights
under the existing law, there is no power in any branch of the
government to take them away; but when they are held contrary
to the existing law, or are forfeited by its violation, then they may
be taken from him-not by an act of the legislature, but in a due
administration
of the law itself-before the judicial tribunals of
1 65
the state.
Mississippi. In Griffin v. Mixon, 66 a statute vested title to land in
the state for nonpayment of taxes. The statute was held to violate the
due course of law clause of the Mississippi Constitution, because it
failed to provide for any judicial proceeding before divestment. Although not a "nonretroactivity" holding, the case nevertheless illustrates that Mississippi followed the principle that there could be no
direct legislative divestment of rights, a principle which was closely associated with retroactivity prohibitions in other states.
163. Id. at 324. Later the court concluded, "The naked case here presented, then, is this:
By the law in force to the close of the year 1863, Mary Robinson, or her grantee, was allowed sixteen years within which to bring suit for recovery of this land; at that instant a
statute took effect, which provided that all remedy whatever for its recovery was thereby
barred. Whether passed at that moment or before, we conceive to be immaterial, and that
the statute cannot be applied to this case without violating a plain principle of constitutional
law." Id. at 328.
164. 11 Minn. 358 (1865).
165. Id. at 375. See also Beaupre v. Hoerr, 13 Minn. 369 (1868), involving a Minnesota
statute which provided that an appeal had to be taken within six months after entry of a
judgment. An appeal was attempted more than six months after entry of judgment on the
date that a new statute went into effect providing a one-year time limit. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota found this latter statute retroactive, and, as a result, a violation of due process.
In the court's view, the judgment represented a vested property right that could not be taken
retroactively.
166. 38 Miss. 424 (1860).
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New York. Numerous decisions in New York supported direct divestiture and retroactivity prohibitions as a principle of due process. In
In re John & Cherry Streets, 67 an 1818 statute authorized New York
City, a public corporation, to take land from its owners and transfer it
to the city on payment of just compensation. This act was invalidated
under the state's law of the land clause, which was interpreted as the
equivalent of a due process clause. In the court's view, the legislature
of the clause to transfer the property of one
had no power by virtue
168
person to another.
While In re John & Cherry Streets articulated a simple "direct divestment" prohibition, Wynehamer v. People'6 9 dealt more specifically
with retroactivity. In Wynehamer, an 1855 statute prohibited the sale
of intoxicating liquor, without distinguishing between liquor existing
on the effective date of the statute and liquor acquired afterwards. One
Wynehamer was indicted and convicted for violating this act and challenged it as unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals agreed
with Wynehamer on the ground that, by failing to distinguish between
existing and after-acquired liquor, the act deprived defendant of his
in violation of the state law of the land and due
vested property rights70
process clauses.'

Justice Comstock declared that the law of the land and due process
clauses require "a judicial investigation, not to be governed by a law
specially enacted to take away and destroy existing rights, but confined
to the question whether, under the preexisting rule of conduct, the right
in controversy has been lawfully acquired and is lawfully possessed."' 7 '
Justice A. S. Johnson agreed that due process "imports a judicial trial,
and not a mere declaration of legislative will by the passing of a
law."' 172 He added, however, that the legislature could not simply add
a requirement of judicial process to an otherwise obnoxious statute and
thereby cure its constitutional deficiencies:
167. 19 Wend. 659 (N.Y. 1839).
168. Id. at 676-77. See also Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), in which a
plaintiff sued in trespass, and defendants justified their entry on his land under the statute
providing for the establishment of private roads after notice and hearing to the landowner.
Damages were to be paid to the landowner by the party applying under a statute for the
private road. The New York Supreme Court invalidated this statute under the state law of
the land and due process clauses, as well as the clause vesting the legislative power of the
state in a senate and assembly. The court stated that "when one man wants the property of
another. . . the legislature cannot aid him in making the acquisition." Id. at 147.
169. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
170. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 144, at 390.
171. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. at 395.
172. Id. at 417.
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To provide for a trial to ascertain whether a man is in the enjoyment of [his] rights, and then, as a consequence of finding that he
is. . .to deprive him of [them], is doing indirectly just what is
forbidden to be done directly, and reduces the constitutional provision to a nullity. For instance, a law that any man who, after
the age of fifty years, shall continue to live, shall be punished by
imprisonment or fine, would be beyond the power of the legislature. It would be so, upon the ground that he cannot be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, and that
the right to live and not be punished for living was put by the
declaration of right beyond the power of legislative

interference. 173
Johnson's remarks strike a chord that was common to the direct
divestment-retroactivity doctrine. The underlying theme of the doc-

trine was that due process precludes subsequent punishment for, or
deprivation of rights that "vest" because of, acts that were, when performed, innocent, or nonliability producing. This appeared to be the
concern of Alexander Hamilton in his remarks on the Act Regulating
Elections,1 74 for example, and it also seemed to have concerned Chief

Justice Taney in the DredScott decision. 75 The persistent statements
that legislatures had no power to take one person's property and give it
to another also seem to reflect the idea that due process prevented cer-

tain kinds of legislative action absolutely, even if a court were somewhere employed to satisfy the "forms which belong to 'due process of
law.' "176
It is important to remember that the prohibitions, whether or not
absolute, were keyed to the central due process requirement of an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding. Justice Selden, for example, stated in Wynehamer that a law that totally restricted the right
to possess and use property violated due process "as it would in the
173. Id. at 420 (Johnson, J.,concurring). Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202(1854), also
dealt with retroactivity. An 1848 statute for the protection of a married women's property
rights declared that a wife's property should be her separate property, as if she were single.
The court interpreted this statute to include any interest the husband had acquired under
preexisting laws. This inclusion was a violation of due process, because the act operated to
deprive the husband of property rights that had vested prior to the statute. Commenting
upon the state due process clause, Justice Denio stated, "The provision was designed to
protect the citizen against all mere acts of power, whether flowing from the legislative or
executive branches of the government. It does not, of course, touch the right of the state to
appropriate private property to public use upon making due compensation, which is fully
recognized in another part of the constitution; but no power in the state can legally confer
upon one person or class of persons the property of another person or class, without their
consent, whatever motives of policy may exist in favor of such transfer." Id. at 212.
174. See text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.
176. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. at 420.
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most effectual manner possible deprive the owner of his property, without the interposition of any court or the use of any process
whatever."' 77 However broad some of the language of the opinions,
therefore, the outer limits of the due process concept insured that the
limitations it imposed on legislative power would be relatively narrow,
even if sometimes absolute, such as the prohibition against retroactive
statutes. 78 General regulatory power over property like intoxicating
liquor was thus conceded to the legislature, even though that power
might be used to restrict "liberty" prospectively without a judicial proceeding.' 79 Only the narrow limitation preventing interference with
"vested rights" took on an absolute cast.1 80
North Carolina. In Hoke v. Henderson,""' the North Carolina
Supreme Court invalidated a retroactive statute.' 82 The plaintiff
claimed the office of clerk of the Superior Court of Lincoln by virtue of
an election held pursuant to a statute enacted in 1832. The defendant
claimed the same office by virtue of his previous appointment to it
under an act of 1806. The 1832 act was held to violate both the separation of powers and law of the land clauses of the North Carolina Constitution. The act was general in form, requiring elections for clerks in
every county of the state and providing for the expulsion of old clerks
from office upon the election of new ones. In discussing why such a
general act violated the separation of powers provision, the court stated
177. Id. at 434. Judge Selden added, "It follows, that a law which, by its own inherent
force, extinguishes rights of property, or compels their extinction, without any legal process
whatever, comes directly in conflict with the constitution." Id.
178. Two of the remaining justices in the majority agreed that the retroactive characteristics of the statute rendered it invalid under the due process clause. 13 N.Y. at 434. See also
id. at 456 (Hubbard, J.), 459 (Denio, C.J.).
179. Compare this statement with text accompanying notes 16-21 supra (discussion of
Allgeyer v. Louisiana).
180. See, e.g., People ex rel. Baldwin v. Haws, 15 Abb. Pr. 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862)
(court declared that legislature may not, under law of the land and due process clauses,
direct municipal corporation to pay claim for damages when corporation denies liability,
without permitting claim to be submitted to judicial tribunal).
181. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
182. Probably the earliest decision articulating a due process prohibition or retroactive
legislation was.Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805). The North
Carolina Legislature had granted lands to the university in 1789. The legislature repealed
this grant in 1800, and the issue was the constitutionality of the repealer. The North Carolina Supreme Court held the 1800 act unconstitutional under the law of the land clause of
the North Carolina Constitution. The court stated that neither members of corporations nor
individuals could be "deprived of their liberties or properties, unless by a trial by jury in a
court of justice, according to the known and established rules of decision derived from the
common law and such acts of the Legislature as are consistent with the Constitution." Id. at
63.
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that, unlike the British Parliament, the North Carolina Legislature had
been expressly denied the faculty of adjudication. 183 Therefore,
[w]henever an act of Assembly. . .is a decision of titles between
individuals, or classes of individuals, although it may in terms
purport to be the introduction of a new rule of title, it is essentially a judgment against the old claim of right: which is not a
legislative, but a judicial function. . . . [Wihere a right of property is acknowledged to have been in one person at one time, and
is held to cease in him and to exist in another, whatever may be
the origin of the new right inthe latter, the destruction of the old
one inthe former is by sentence.'84

In evaluating the law of the land clause violation, the court stated
that the term "law of the land" did not mean merely an act of the legislature.185 Rather, the clause meant that a legislative act that attempted
directly to punish a person or to deprive him of his property without a

judicial proceeding "and a decision upon the matter of right, as deter86
mined by the laws under which it vested" was unconstitutional.1
Pennsylvania. In Norman v.Heist, 187 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a lower court ruling on the grounds that the lower
court had misinterpreted a statute by reading it to retroactively divest
the plaintiffs of a property right. The court, however, clearly indicated
that the statute would have violated the Pennsylvania law of the land
clause if it had been retroactive. "Law of the land" was held to mean

"a pre-existent rule of conduct, declarative Qf a penalty for a prohibited
act; not an expostfacto rescript or decree made for the occasion." 188
In Greenough v.Greenough,8 9 the plaintiff sued his brother in an

183. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 11.
184. Id. (emphasis in original).
185. See id. at 13.
186. Id. at 14.
187. 5 Watts & Serg. 171 (Pa. 1843).
188. Id. at 173. The court further stated, "It was deemed necessary to insert a special
provision in the Constitution to enable them to take private property even for public use,
and on compensation made; but it was not deemed necessary to disable them specially in
regard to taking the property of an individual, with or without compensation, in order to
give it to another, not only because the general provision in the bill of rights was deemed
sufficiently explicit for that, but [also] because it was expected that no Legislature would be
so regardless of [individual] right[s] as to attempt [to take the property]." Id. at 174. See
also Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86 (1847), a case in which the legislature passed an act significantly altering the terms of a will which 40 years before had established an orphanage. One
of the terms altered was that certain real estate was to be severed from the orphanage and
sold. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held this act unconstitutional under the state law of
the land clause, because, without judicial proceedings, it had divested the original trustees of
the orphanage of rights that had accrued to them under the will. Id. at 97.
189. 11 Pa. 489 (1849).
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action of ejectment, asserting that his sister's will, under which the
brother claimed, had not been properly executed. If this were the case,
the plaintiff would have been entitled to take by intestacy upon the
sister's death in 1841. The sister had made her mark on the will, but
court decisions interpreting an 1833 statute had declared a mark to be
insufficient where there was no proof that the name was written at the
express direction of the testatrix. To overrule those decisions, the legislature passed an act in 1848 declaring marks without proof to be valid.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the 1848 act violated
both the separation of powers and law of the land clauses of the state
constitution. The separation of powers clause was violated because the
act was a legislative command to the courts to establish a particular
interpretation of a statute, and thus it was a judicial act beyond the
legislature's power. The law of the land clause was violated because
the statute, while general in operation, directly (and retroactively)
divested particular rights.19°
Rhode Island. Not all courts agreed that due process imposed a
retroactivity limitation on the state legislature. In State v. Keeran,191
for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court confronted a case much
like the New York decision in Wynehamer v. People. 92 Keeran was
indicted for keeping "a grogshop and tippling-shop" in violation of a
Rhode Island statute. He challenged the statute as unconstitutional on
the ground, inter alia, that it deprived him of his property "in liquors
lawfully held for sale at the time this system of legislation commenced,
by making them unsalable." 93 The court disagreed with this interpretation of the Rhode Island law of the land clause, holding that the
clause was designed only to protect the trial rights of an accused in a
criminal case and did not limit the power of the legislature to define
94

1
new crimes.

190. See id. at 495. By no means would all states have considered such "curative" retroactive laws invalid. See, e.g., Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149 (1861); Walpole v. Elliott,
18 Ind. 258 (1862); Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa 292 (1865); State v. Norwood, 12 Md.
195 (1858); Foster v. The Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 244 (1819); Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 214
(1865); Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H. 304 (1859); State v. City of Newark, 27 N.J.L. 185 (1858);
Gould v. Town of Sterling, 23 N.Y. 457 (1861); Chesnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio 599
(1847); Tate v. Stooltzfoos, 16 Serg. & Rawle 34 (Pa. 1827); Talman v. City of Janesville, 17
Wis. 71 (1863).
191. 5 R.I. 497 (1858).
192. See text accompanying notes 169-78 supra.
193. State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. at 504.
194. See id. at 507. See also State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858), a previous case in which the
same court held that the statute did not constitute an ex postfacto law merely because it

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

C.

[Vol. 9:851

Summary of "Substantive Due Process" Before the Fourteenth
Amendment

The Rhode Island court's narrow view of the limitations imposed
by due process was decidedly a minority position." 5 The decisions
from other states, discussed above, indicate that law of the land/due

process clauses were generally understood to prohibit legislatures from
directly divesting a person of rights established under preexisting law.

Although these decisions may have been vulnerable to criticism on the
grounds that they employed a highly conceptualistic view of the due
process requirement and extended it beyond the generally understood

reach of the respective constitutional clauses at the time those clauses
were adopted, 1 96 this is beside the point insofar as interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned. For the purpose of establishing
the general understanding of the due process clause of the Amendment
at the time it was ratified, the case law indicates that the clause most

likely was understood to embody a restriction against retroactive statutes at the date of its adoption. At least twelve jurisdictions 97 indicated agreement that due process precluded direct legislative
divestitures, the requirement from which the retroactivity limitation
was, with relative ease, derived. Seven' 9 of these explicitly held that
retroactive statutes violated due process, and it is a fair inference that

Tennessee and Iowa, the states that had adopted broad general law interpretations, can be added to the list of those opposing retrospective
legislation.' 9 9 Thus, it appears, though not conclusively, that the direct
retrospectively destroyed the value of property in the hands of liquor sellers when it took
effect. See id at 190.
195. The Rhode Island cases are sometimes cited as authority for the proposition that the
Wynehamer interpretation of due process was an abberation. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note
45, at 16, 190 n.18; Corwin, supra note 48, at 474-75; Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
FourteenthAmendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 442 (1926). Given the number of decisions
supporting the Wynehamer position discussed in the text, this proposition seems doubtful.
Moreover, even if Wynehamer's particular application of the retroactivity limitation was
abberational, the limitation itself was broadly supported in the case law.
196. As the Rhode Island court observed in State v. Keeran, this may have been a remote
inference from the core due process requirement of a judicial proceeding before life, liberty,
or property could be taken. 5 R.I. at 504. The court also commented on "the loose habit of
taking constitutional clauses, which, from their history and obvious purpose, have a welldefined meaning, away from all their natural connections, and, by drawing remote inferences from them, of pressing them into the service of any constitutional objection which the
ingenuity or fancy of the objector may contrive or suggest." Id. at 504-05.
197. See notes 145-90 and accompanying text supra.
198. The states were Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
199. See, e.g., Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa 389 (1861); Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14
Tenn. (6 Yer.) 78 (1834). See also notes 119 & 130 supra (discussing authorities in Texas,
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divestiture-nonretroactivity application of due process was sufficiently
accepted to constitute a part of the general understanding of the meaning of the phrase before the Fourteenth Amendment. A majority of the
existing states had not so held,z' ° but the application was far from abberational and seems to have followed easily from the opportunity to
be heard principle, which was at the core of due process.2 °1 Certainly
majority position among the
the retroactivity limitation was a clear
202
states that had considered the issue.

Arkansas, and Mississippi that may indicate acceptance by those states of broad application
of general law requirement).
200. There were 37 states at the time the Amendment was ratified. See J. JAMES, THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192 (1965).
201. The direct holdings that retroactive statutes violated due process are buttressed by
other evidence of the "general understanding." For one thing, whether they directly declared retroactive statutes to be violative of due process or not, the courts were very hostile
to such statutes. Consequently, the courts often either invoked a presumption against the
retroactive operation of a legislative act or simply construed statutes as prospective without
reference to a rule of interpretation, thus avoiding any constitutional conflict (and constitutional holding) in the case before them. See, e.g., Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351 (1851);
Billings v. Detten, 15 IM.218 (1853); Thompson v. Alexander, 11 M. 54 (1849); State v.
Barbee, 3 Ind. 258 (1852); Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa 257 (1863); Hedger v. Rennaker, 60
Ky. (3 Met.) 229 (1860); Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111 (1862); State v. Norwood, 12 Md.
195 (1858); Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215 (1819); Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 111
(1861); Garrett v. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377 (1852); Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473 (1826);
Southard v. Central R.R. Co., 26 N.J.L. 13 (1856); Bay v. Gage, 36 Barb. 447 (N.Y. 1862);
Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86 (1846); State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 441 (1860). In addition, a
number of cases indicated by way of dictum that retroactive statutes that interfered with
vested rights were unconstitutional, though it was not always clear whether the courts were
referring to a due process limitation or to a contract clause limit, a general separation of
powers limit, a natural law limit, or a specific nonretroactivity clause in the state constitution. The "vested rights" reasoning of the courts was similar whichever sort of constitutional
objection was involved. See, e.g., Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 155-56 (1865); Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa 292 (1865); Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111 (1862); Medford v.
Learned, 16 Mass. 215 (1819); Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 1I1 (1861); Garrett v. Beaumont,
24 Miss. 377 (1852); Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H. 304 (1859); Southard v. The Central R.R. Co.,
26 N.J.L. 13 (1856); Syracuse City Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188 (N.Y. 1853); Dash v. Van
Kleeck, 7 Johns. 447 (N.Y. 1811); Butler v. City of Toledo, 5 Ohio St. 225 (1855); Bleakney
v. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank, 17 Serg. & Rawle 64 (Pa. 1827). Similarly, a number of
courts held retroactive legislation unconstitutional when, in their perception, it "divested"
rights. Sometimes this was done under specific constitutional provisions prohibiting retrospective laws, and on other occasions very general "vested rights," "separation of powers,"
or "natural law" language was used, so that it is not possible to classify these cases as applications of a due process clause. Again, however, the reasoning in the cases was similar to the
reasoning in the due process cases discussed in the text. See, e.g., Brinton v. Seevers, 12
Iowa 389 (1861); Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 199 (1861); Routsong v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174
(1864); Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 380 (1839); Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 78
(1834).
202. Nevertheless, some modern commentators have disagreed that the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment was generally understood to incorporate a nonretroactivity
limitation on state power. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 144. "The
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The same cannot be said of the "partial law" restriction of due
process. Both "partial laws" and retroactive laws were prohibited by
due process under the generally accepted view prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, both were prohibited on the theory that the legislature had no power to directly divest someone of rights without a judicial proceeding. The restriction against partial laws, however, was
generally accepted only to the extent of prohibiting the legislature from
adjudicating individual cases by statute, while the nonretroactivity
principle was generally thought to place broader restrictions on legislative regulatory power. The commonly understood meaning of due process at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified would,
therefore, have encompassed only a narrow partial law restriction.
Before one can demonstrate the extent to which due process may
validly be utilized to limit state choice-of-law power, the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context must be supplemented by an examination
of the framing and ratification of the Amendment. Such an examination will show whether or not the general understanding of due process
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment was contradicted by a different
understanding evidenced in the framing and ratification process.
framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clauses, however, did not
specifically design those provisions to cover retroactive legislation. Therefore ....
the Due
Process Clauses fail to provide the Court with any definite criteria to determine when retroactive legislation violates constitutional principles." Id. at 428-29. It is not clear upon what
basis the authors conclude that the Framers of the amendments did not "design" the provisions to prohibit retroactive legislation. To the extent that due process clauses are separation
of powers commands-and they clearly are-it is far from apparent that the reasoning of the
courts discussed in the text is invalid, however "remote" it seems to be from the core due
process opportunity to be heard principle. Certainly other commentators have concluded
that prospectivity in lawmaking is one of the essential elements that makes a statute "law."
See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 51-62 (rev. ed. 1969). Despite the analytical difficulty of distinguishing between "innocent" and "harmful" retroactive laws, therefore, it seems quite plausible to conclude that when a legislature attempts to make certain
kinds of laws retroactive, it exceeds the proper boundaries of the legislative branch and
performs the functions, instead, of a court. Cf.id. at 55 ("A second aspect of retrospective
lawmaking relates. . . to the circumstance that it unavoidably attaches in some measure to
the office of judge.")
In any event, it is important to note that if the nonretroactivity limitation is not considered a valid application of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, then there is no
justifiable "substantive" component in the clause. If true, this supposition would simplify
considerably the task of this article. For in the absence of any substantive component, it is
clear that the due process clause cannot be legitimately used to restrict state choice-of-law
authority at all. Cf. Vhitten II, supra note 9 (finding no justification for sovereignty-oriented territorial restrictions on state court jurisdiction under the due process clause). See
also note 261 and accompanying text infra.
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IV. The Framing and Ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment
One must use evidence drawn from the framing and ratification of
a constitutional provision with extreme care. In establishing the meaning of a clause, the central concern, as suggested above, must be to
identify the general understanding of the words used at the time of
ratification. "The doctrine of ratification premises that the principal
knows what he is ratifying."20 3 This understanding cannot depend on
special or secret meanings used by the Framers of a clause.2" Otherwise there could never exist shared canons of action between Framers
and ratifiers,20 5 and, worse, the Framers might be able to proceed by
subterfuge in proposing constitutional amendments.20 6 Use of a concept of "general understanding" assures that the obligations of communicator (the Framers) and audience (the ratifiers) will be properly
distributed. Common sense tells us that it is not customary for persons
to communicate through language to which an abberational meaning is
attached, and even if this should occur, it would hardly be fair to an
audience to frustrate action it takes under the impression that a different, more generally understood, meaning is intended. Similarly, if the
audience is permitted to understand and to act on the words used in a
bizarre fashion, efficient communication processes can never be adequately established. To avoid problems such as these in the process of
constitutional formation, it is imperative that both Framers and ratifiers be held to have respectively used and understood language in its
commonly accepted meaning. More importantly, judges faced with the
necessity of adjudicating future disputes under a constitutional clause
must bind themselves to enforce the general understanding of the
clause, lest they become super constitution makers, who frustrate the
by applying the Constitution too narordinary amendment 20processes
7
rowly or too broadly.
If a concept of "general understanding" is to control, the legislative history of an amendment can be used only in certain limited ways.
It can, of course, be used as evidence of what the general understanding
of a constitutional clause was when it was adopted. To the extent, however, that evidence drawn from the framing and ratification process
tends to contradict the demonstrated general understanding of the lan203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

R. BERGER, supra note 48, at 69.
See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 755.
See Whitten, Book Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1479, 1490 (1980).
See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 755, 757.
See text accompanying notes 261-97 infra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY

[VoL. 9:851

guage taken from the pre-amendment context, the "legislative history"
cannot be allowed to control. Insofar as utterances of the Framers are
concerned, Thomas Cooley long ago explained why they cannot be
given "controlling force":
When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief
designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the
proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument.
Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the
question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive
from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. Every
member of such a convention acts upon such motives and reasons
as influence him personally, and the motions and debates do not
necessarily indicate the purpose of a majority of a convention in
adopting a particular clause. It is quite possible for a clause to
appear so clear and unambiguous to the members of a convention as to require neither discussion nor illustration; and the few
remarks made concerning it in the convention might have a plain
tendency to lead directly away from the meaning in the minds of
the majority. It is equally possible for a part of the members to
accept a clause in one sense and a part in another. And even if
we were certain we had attained to the meaning of the convention, it is by no means to be allowed a controlling force, especially if that meaning appears not to be the one which the words
would most naturally and obviously convey. For as the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed,
but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is
that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have
looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed,
but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in
the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed. 20
Many of the deficiencies present in legislative history drawn from
the framing of a constitutional clause are also inherent in the legislative
history of the ratification process, for precisely the same reasons. Thus,
ratification materials seem almost as unreliable in determining meaning as framing debates.209 For these reasons, the examination of the
framing and ratification process is limited to an outline of what each
contributes to the general understanding of the due process clause.210
208. T. COOLEY, supra note 101, at 66.
209. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 137-97 (1975).
210. I have elsewhere examined these processes more extensively in the context of determining the extent the due process clause may be read to limit judicial jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Readers wishing a fuller account of the framing and ratification
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Of particular concern is evidence that contradicts the general understanding of due process of law established by the pre-Fourteenth
Amendment context.
A.

The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment

That there is no direct reference in the historical materials to the
application of "due process of law" to choice-of-law problems is not
2 11
surprising, given the great purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
clause in
It is surprising, however, that the references to the due process
21 2
the debates of the Thirty-ninth Congress were "scanty."
The primary concern of the Framers was equality under the
law.2 13 The addition of the elements of privileges and immunities and
due process seemed almost to be an afterthought, to which the Framers
attached little significance.2 14 For example, Senator Jacob Howard of
Massachusetts explained the meaning of the Amendment to the Senate
as follows:
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable
a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States,
but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal
protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the States .... It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws
over the white man.2 15
Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania explained to
the House of Representatives that the purposes of section one of the
Amendment were to allow
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that
the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish
the black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree.
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to
one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man
to testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same.
These are great advantages over their present codes. Now differdebates may, therefore, refer to Whitten II, supra note 9, at 804-21, and authorities cited
therein.
211. See id.at 805.
212. R. BERGER, supra note 48, at 201.
213. See J.TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 187-89, 190 (1951).
214. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 805, and authorities cited therein.
215. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
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ent degrees of punishment are inflicted, not on account of the
magnitude of the crime, but according to the color of the skin.
Now color disqualifies a man from testifying in courts, or being
tried in the same way as white men. I need not enumerate these
partial and oppressive laws.2 16
Stevens' reference to "partial laws" might have meant that he understood the due process clause to incorporate the broad partial law
limitation evidenced in the few state cases discussed above.2 17 However, this interpretation is far from certain. Stevens' reference might
have been to the more commonly accepted narrow application of the
partial law restriction.2 18 Alternatively, he might have been saying that
the equal protection clause of section one, as opposed to the due process clause, was intended to embody the broad partial law restriction.21 9 Even if Stevens meant to refer to the broad partial law
limitation applied in some of the due process cases, his remarks alone
cannot be given controlling effect, because they run counter to the generally accepted significance of the words "due process of law" at the
time the Amendment was adopted.
There are other indications that the Framers used "due process of
law" in its generally accepted sense. Ohio Representative John A.
Bingham, speaking in favor of an early form of the Fourteenth Amendment,220 quoted the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment while
arguing in favor of giving Congress power to enforce the "protection of
life, liberty, and property" against the states.2 2 ' When Bingham was
asked what he meant by "due process of law," he replied: "[T]he courts
have settled that long ago, and the gentleman [asking the question] can
go and read their decisions. ' 222 Bingham's reply seems to be a clear
reference to the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context, which establishes
no broad partial law restriction as a generally understood part of due
216. Id. at 2459.
217. See section III(A) supra.
218. See id.
219. Others have seen the possibility that the equal protection clause was designed to
codify a partial law restriction. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 48. at 176. This explanation makes sense given that the broad partial law restriction was not generally accepted as a
part of due process. Thus, if such a requirement were thought desirable, it would have been
necessary to express the requirement in language other than due process language to insure
that it would become law.
220. "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
221. Id. at 1089.
222. Id.
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process. This reference tends to counter the argument of some commentators 23 (an argument supported by language in certain congressional debates 224 and early decisions225 interpreting the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) 2 6 that the clause was only
designed to require the states to establish nondiscriminatory procedures. There is additional evidence that due process had more meaning than this, 227 but even if there were no such evidence, the preFourteenth Amendment context discussed in the previous section
would remain the most reliable guide to the meaning of the due process
clause. On the whole, therefore, the history of the Amendment's framing adds little or nothing to what we have previously learned from the
pre-Amendment decisions about the meaning of due process.
B. The Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
There is a substantial body of evidence in the political speeches
and ratifying debates about the Fourteenth Amendment that indicates
that equality before the law was the primary objective of section one of
the Amendment. 22 8 Nonetheless, this evidence is not conclusive support for those who argue that the due process clause only required nondiscriminatory procedures, for there also existed a great deal of
evidence that the ratifying states feared the due process clause would
result in an enormous increase in the power of the national government
and a concomitant subordination of state authority.2 29 Consequently,
the evidence tends to indicate that the Amendment should be read as
more than a requirement of equal access to judicial proceedings for all
persons. In any event, the ratification evidence no more accurately indicates the meaning of due process of law than does the framing evi223. See, e.g., H. MEYER, supra note 48, at 126-27.
224. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 87 (1871) (Representative Storm
of Pennsylvania, during the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1871, remarked that due
process in the Fourteenth Amendment was the process of the states).
225. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,535 (1884); Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877); Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U.S. 480, 481 (1875); Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875); Rowan v. State, 30 Wis: 129, 143-44 (1872).
226. There were also contradictory references in the debates and cases cited in notes 22425 supra, indicating that due process did much more than require nondiscriminatory procedures. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) (citing Webster's definition); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 87 (1871) (containing remarks of
Representative Storm that due process is reaffirmation of principles of common law inhibiting what is wrongper se); Whitt'n II, supra note 9, at 810-11 n.344.
227. See generally Whitten II, supra note 9, at 807-10.
228. See id. at 811.
229. See id. at 811-17.
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dence,23 ° with the result that the pre-Amendment context remains the
most reliable source of data with which to interpret the phrase.
The ratification debates cannot be said to contradict the meaning
established by the pre-Amendment context, because content of the debates is not sufficiently clear. The broad fears expressed by some of the
states about an "alarming concentration of power" in the federal courts
and a "prostitution of the independence of the States" 23 ' do not reveal
the precise mechanism by which the "concentration of power" and
"prostitution of independence" would take place. Were the states' fears
based on the view that the due process clause embodied a broad partial
law restriction? Or were those fears based on the nonretroactivity principle established in the pre-Amendment context? The debates simply
do not reveal the precise mechanism; therefore, they are of little value
in fixing the meaning of the due process clause. There is, of course, no
specific reference to choice-of-law issues in the ratification debates, any
more than there is in the legislative history of the Amendment's
framing.
C. Summary of the Evidence from the Pre-Amendment Context
Through the Framing and Ratification Period

From English law through the pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions interpreting due process of law and the framing and ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, one concept remained constant: The
outer limits of the phrase "due process of law" were accepted to be that
a person could not be deprived of a right without first being given an
opportunity to be heard in defense in a judicial proceeding. Within
this principle, American courts evolved several subsidiary rules of decision. The primary one was that a legislature could not, consistent with
due process, directly divest a person of his rights by statute. From this
concept, the courts fashioned other rules. One of these rules was that
the legislature could not adjudicate individual cases by statute; another
was that the legislature could not retroactively deprive a person of
rights that had validly been acquired under a preexisting law. This
latter rule, though seemingly remote from the opportunity to be heard
principle, was based on the idea that a statute that effectively destroyed
rights established under existing law denied the aggrieved person of a
judicial hearing. To arrive at this result, of course, the courts had to
conclude that a judicial hearing implied the right to have one's liability
adjudicated under a "standing" or "preexisting" law, thus removing so230. See id.
231. Id. at 812-15.
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called "vested rights" from the scope of legislative power even if the
legislature was prepared to provide compensation for the taking of the
right.
However conceptualistic this may appear to twentieth century legal thinkers, the retroactivity principle seemed to follow easily from the
established nineteenth century notion that the legislative branch of
government could not directly take a person's life, liberty, or property.
Thus, the limitation would seem to have been a generally understood
part of due process at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. The central question concerning this article is whether or not
limits on state choice-of-law authority may be validly deduced from
this established meaning. In particular, it is of great interest whether or
not any of the modem choice-of-law restrictions evolved by the
Supreme Court under the due process clause are justifiable under the
probable original meaning of the clause.
V.

Due Process as a Limitation on State
Choice-of-Law Authority

Superficially, it may appear that the original, general understanding of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment discussed
in the previous sections justifies the approach to state choice-of-law authority taken by the Supreme Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.232 The
pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions interpreting due process of law
were concerned with the protection of vested rights from legislative takings without judicial process. The Allgeyer doctrine was also concerned with protecting vested rights from interference by states with no
legislative jurisdiction over the transaction or occurrence in which the
right was acquired. Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two lines of doctrine. As discussed above, the pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases did not attempt to confine the regulatory
power of the state legislatures to affect liberty or property in a general
way. Although a legislature could not destroy vested property rights
retroactively, or transfer rights from one private party to another, general regulatory laws operating prospectively could effectively limit liberty or property rights. Allgeyer, on the other hand, read into the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a set of territorial rules
that were generally designed to limit the power of the legislature to
affect liberty and property rights prospectively. There is no general
232. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See discussion in text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
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support for a doctrine of such breadth in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases.
One might' think, however, that Allgeyer simply represents a justifiable extension of a settled due process principle to the choice-of-law
area. Since the direct divestment-retroactivity limitation sought to protect vested rights intraterritorially, Allgeyer is arguably a logical extension of this doctrine to multistate events. By analogy, the preFourteenth Amendment cases established piinciples that have been legitimately extended to different circumstances arising subsequent to the
Amendment's passage. For example, the broadest principle established
by the due process clause is that a person may not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without first being given an opportunity to be heard
in a judicial proceeding. One of the essential attributes of this opportunity to be heard principle is notice to the defendant.23 3 Although the
pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions permitted the legislature wide
discretion in substituting different forms of notice for personal service
of process, 23 4 modem decisions have established a more stringent notice requirement which mandates that the legislature employ the best
notice practicable under the circumstances.23 5 Whether or not a particular form of notice is the best form practicable under the circumstances
depends on other forms available to a legislature; prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, notice by publication in a newspaper may have
been the best form available, but today notice by mail may be easier,
less expensive, and more likely to reach the defendant. Thus, a requirement that the legislature employ mail notice in many cases can be
viewed as a valid application of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment notice
requirements in a different context. Can Allgeyer similarly be viewed
as the application of a settled principle for the protection of vested
rights in a multistate setting-an application that could not have occured prior to the Fourteenth Amendment?
The answer is almost certainly "no." Certain courts viewed the
direct divestment-retroactivity limitation as remote from the central
premise of the due process clause.2 36 Consequently, the cases establishing the limitation could perhaps have been criticized as wrong at the
time they were decided. 23 7 Nevertheless, the limitation should be considered a valid part of the general understanding of due process at the
233.
234.
235.
(1950).
236.
237.

See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 798-99.
See id.
See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20
See, e.g., notes 191-96 and accompanying text supra.
See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
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time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, because there was substantial case support for it in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context. 238 The essential point, of course, is not that, in a case of first
impression today, such a remote doctrine would be derived from the
core opportunity to be heard principle, but that the courts prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment apparently did so derive it. However distorted
the doctrine may seem today, it seems to have been ingrained in the
meaning of due process when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
and it should, consequently, be enforced as a part of that Amendment.
The same cannot be said of the Allgeyer doctrine. The doctrine
was not rooted in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context, except as it
can be described as an extension of the "remote" direct divestmentretroactivity limitation. It is one thing to argue that an unusual application of a principle should be part of a constitutional clause because
that application was so widely supported that it constituted a part of
the general understanding, and quite another to argue that the remote
application, instead of being confined within its own boundaries, can
be evolved into a fundamentally broader constitutional principle. The
situation is quite unlike the due process notice example discussed
above. A notice requirement is a straightforward application of the
broadest principle to be found in the due process clause-the opportunity to be heard principle. Thus, the evolution of new notice requirements as better forms of notice become available is within the outer
limits of the due process clause. Extension of the "remote" direct divestiture-retroactivity doctrine to protect vested rights through territorial choice-of-law rules, on the other hand, runs a severe risk of
exceeding the proper boundaries of the clause. Such rules have apparently nothing to do with the opportunity to be heard principle, which is
at most concerned with procedural matters such as notice, the right to
an impartial judge, the right to a place of trial that does not enormously
burden the defendant, and so forth. 39 Nor do the rules have any support in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context.2" Therefore, while retention of the direct divestiture-retroactivity limitation can be justified
as part of the due process clause because of the support it finds in the
pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions, any expansion of it into a general, territorial limitation on state authority designed to protect "vested
238. See id.
239. See generally Whitten II, supra note 9, at 803-04.
240. See id at 835-36, which argues that territorial rules ofjudicialjurisdiction were improperly incorporated within the due process clause in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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rights" would exceed the permissible limits of the clause as those limits
were probably understood when the Amendment was ratified.
If the Allgeyer doctrine cannot be considered a valid appliation of
the due process clause, is the same true of the narrower approach to
state choice-of-law authority taken in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague?2 4 ' In Hague, the Supreme Court indicated that a state's law
could be applied to a dispute whenever the state has significant contacts
with the parties and the occurrence or transaction that gives it a legitimate interest in controlling the matter in question.24 2 As indicated earlier, this means the application of a state's law will not be invalidated
unless the state has no legitimate interest at all in controlling the transaction or occurrence underlying the dispute.2 43
There certainly seems to be something wrong with the application
of the law of a state with no legitimate interest in the dispute. Whether
it is right or wrong as a matter of choice of law, however, is not the
question. The question is whether or not even this limited choice-oflaw restriction can be deemed a valid part of the due process clause. It
seems clear that it cannot. To evolve choice-of-law restrictions from
the due process clause in a legitimate fashion, the restrictions fashioned
must, at a minimum, be within the outer boundaries of the most general principle incorporated within the clause. This is obviously not the
case with regard to the legitimate state interest test. The test is designed
as a restriction on state "legislative jurisdiction," and as such it is, at its
core, founded upon the notion that the due process clause embodies a
certain kind of territorial restraint on state lawmaking authority. Specifically, the test supposes that due process incorporates restrictions
designed to regulate the status of the states as coequal sovereigns in the
federal system. There is, however, no substantial evidence that the due
process clause was understood in this way at the time it was ratified.
Indeed, there is solid reason to believe that the similar sovereigntybased territorial rules of judicial jurisdiction incorporated within the
clause in Pennoyer v. Neff' did not represent a legitimate application
of due process. 4 There is surely no greater reason to conclude that the
clause incorporated sovereignty-based choice-of-law restrictions on
state power.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

449 U.S. 302 (1981).
See id. at 308.
See text accompanying note 6 supra.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 835.
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When additionally it is considered that there is no relationship between the usual contents of the opportunity to be heard principle and
conflict-of-laws rules designed to regulate the sovereignty of the states
vis-tt-vis each other, it seems clear that the formulation of the legitimate

state interest limitation under the due process clause is not valid. As
noted above, the opportunity to be heard principle commonly focuses
on the trial rights of the defendant. Notice, an impartial trier of fact, a
place of trial that is not extremely burdensome, and other similar elements flow directly from this principle; however, the notion of choosing
applicable law based upon an evaluation of the legitimate governmental interests of a state is unconnected with the principle. Therefore,
while it is surely wrong for a state with no legitimate interest to have its
law applied to a dispute, and while it is obviously desirable that there
be national restraints on the power of the states to do so, the current

choice-of-law restraints fashioned by the Supreme Court under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not represent a legitimate means of establishing such limits on state power. Broad national
restrictions on state authority must be formulated, if at all, under some

other constitutional provision.2
Nevertheless, the Court does recognize one legitimate way in

which the due process clause may be applied to restrict state choice-oflaw authority. The plurality opinion inAllstate Insurance Co. v. Hague
stated: "By virtue of its presence [in Minnesota], Allstate can hardly
claim unfamiliarity with [Minnesota laws] and surprise that the state

courts might apply forum law to litigation in which the company is
involved."'2 47 Thus, the plurality concluded that
246. The obvious choice of a constitutional provision with which to limit state power is
the full faith and credit clause. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. I have elsewhere argued that,
while this clause imposes no direct limitations on state choice-of-law power, it does give
Congress the authority to establish nationwide conflict of laws rules, if Congress so chooses.
See Whitten-Choice ofLaw, supra note 9, at 68-69; Whitten I, supra note 9, at 604. Thus,
the proper means of imposing choice-of-law restrictions on the states is through legislative
action under the full faith and credit clause.
247. 449 U.S. 302, 317-18 (1981). The plurality opinion adopted the legitimate state interest test to determine the validity of a state's application of its own law under both the full
faith and credit and due process clauses. See id. at 312-13. Furthermore, the plurality did
not separate dqe process elements from full faith and credit elements in its discussion of the
interest test, to demonstrate how the application of the test satisfied each provision. See id.
at 307-20. This approach is to be contrasted with that of the concurring and dissenting
justices, who distinguished between the operation of the clauses. See id. at 320-32 (Stevens,
J., concurring), 332-40 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
The dissenters, while agreeing with the plurality that both the full faith and credit and due
process clauses were satisfied if the state had significant contacts with the litigation giving it
a legitimate interest in the application of its law to the dispute, were especially careful to
discuss how each clause was satisfied by the test, making it clear in the process that "unfair
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[t]here is no element of unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate
expectations as a result of Minnesota's choice of its law. Because
Allstate was doing business in Minnesota and was undoubtedly
aware that Mr. Hague was a Minnesota employee, it had to have
anticipated that Minnesota law might apply to an accident in
which Mr. Hague was involved.24 8

Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Hague, Justice Stevens declared
that "a choice of law decision would violate the Due Process Clause if

it were totally arbitrary or if it were fundamentally unfair to either litigant."24 9 Justice Stevens later stated that the "desire to prevent unfair

surprise to a litigant has been the central concern" of the Court in enforcing this fairness or 25
reasonableness
standard against the states in
0
choice-of-law situations.
The three dissenting justices agreed that the due process clause
protected the legitimate expectations of the parties to a dispute: "[Tihe
contacts between the forum State and the litigation should not be so

'slight and casual' that it would be fundamentally unfair to a litigant
for the forum to apply its own State's law. The touchstone here is the
surprise" was an element of due process. See id. at 336. Therefore, while the plurality might
agree that the "unfair surprise" objection is a due process limitation, and that additional
limitations predicated on the idea that the sovereign power of the states should be held in
check by the Constitution and flow from the full faith and credit clause, this agreement is
uncertain. The plurality may instead view the due process clause as containing both unfair
surprise and sovereignty-based limitations. For a different interpretation, see World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), where a six-member majority of the
Court, in a jurisdiction case, concluded that the due process clause contained sovereigntybased restrictions on state power as well as "fundamental fairness" restrictions. The majority included one member of the plurality in Hague, Justice White (who wrote the majority
opinion in World Wide Volkswagen), and Justice Stevens, who concurred in Hague. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, the remaining members of the Hague plurality, dissented in opinions that do not make it entirely clear whether or not they believe due process
contains sovereignty-based limits, though they did emphasize the state's interest in asserting
jurisdiction more thoroughly than the majority.
248. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24.
249. Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens believed that the due process
and full faith and credit clauses should be distinguished from each other and that the "unfair surprise" limitation was a component of the due process clause. See id. at 320-22, 327.
The full faith and credit clause prevents one state from infringing upon the sovereignty of
other states. See id. at 322-23. That clause is violated when the state's application of its own
law "threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the
legitimate interests of another State." Id. at 323. On the other hand, the due process clause
protects against a choice-of-law decision that is "totally arbitrary" or "fundamentally unfair" to either litigant. Id. at 326. According to Justice Stevens, such "unfairness" could be
demonstrated in a variety of ways. For example, where the forum's choice of its own law
"favored residents over non-residents," the choice represented "a dramatic departure from
the rule that obtains in most American jurisdictions," or "was unfair on its face or as applied." Id. at 326-27.
250. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 327.
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reasonable
This doctrine, as stated by the various members of the Court, is
much too broad. There is no evidence in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context to support invalidation of state laws on the grounds that
they generally are "unreasonable" or "fundamentally unfair." 252 It is
true that the purpose of the law of the land and due process clauses was
to protect against arbitrary invasion of an individual's rights by the
government, and a variety of laws, including retroactive ones, might
well deserve to be labeled "arbitrary," "unfair," or "unreasonable." To
deduce from this purpose, though, that due process was meant to embody a broad fairness principle seems incorrect. The Framers of the
due process and law of the land clauses did not set out to eliminate
"arbitrariness," "unfairness," or "unreasonableness" in the abstract.
Rather, they chose a specific constitutional mechanism with which to
eliminate a particular kind of arbitrary action. The mechanism was the
requirement of a judicial proceeding in which a person who was to be
deprived of his life, liberty, or property by a state could be heard in
defense. Once such a hearing was provided, however, the mechanism
for the prevention of arbitrariness was exhausted. Any further qualities
of unfairness or unreasonableness had to be dealt with by other constitutional provisions, or through the political processes. Due process
clauses did not give the courts a mandate to roam about the legal-political landscape stamping out laws that seemed "unfair" or "unreasona251. Id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissenters distinguished
between the choice-of-law limitations imposed by the due process clause and those imposed
by the full faith and credit clause. Due process is concerned with fundamental unfairness
and the limitation of state sovereign power in the federal system, while full faith and credit
is concerned only with the accommodation of sovereign power among the states. See id. at
332-40. Reasonable expectations are protected under the fundamental fairness component
of due process. See id. Thus the dissenters agreed with Justice Stevens that, for analytical
purposes, the full faith and credit and due process clauses should be separated from each
other, but (i) concluded that due process also contains limitations designed to check the
power of the states as coequal sovereigns in the federal system (whereas Justice Stevens
allocated this function solely to the full faith and credit clause), and (ii) agreed with the
plurality that the test to be applied to determine whether or not all the limitations of both
clauses have been satisfied is the legitimate state interest test. See 449 U.S. 302, 332-40
(1981); notes 2.47 & 249 supra.
252. See R. BERGER, supra note 46, at 194; Whitten II, supra note 9, at 795. All members of the Court in Allstate seemed to agree that due process generally prohibits "arbitrariness" and "fundamental unfairness." See 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality noting that
choice-of-law may be neither "arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair"); id. at 326 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that choice of law violates due process if "arbitrary" or "fundamentally
unfair"); id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Berger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) (stating
that contacts between forum and litigation must not be so slight that it would be "fundamentally unfair" for forum to apply its own law).
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ble" to the judicial mind.2 53 The elimination of arbitrary or unfair
deprivations of individual rights was accomplished exclusively within
the confines of a judicial hearing; generally speaking, such an elimination had no substantive overtones.25 4

The pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions did, however, articulate
a "substantive" standard that probably formed a part of the general
understanding of due process at the time the Amendment was ratified.

This standard was the retroactivity limitation of the early cases, discussed above.2 55 The retroactivity limitation was a "remote" and awk-

ward application of the requirement of judicial proceedings, but it
appears to have been commonly accepted by the state courts. At the

bottom of this limitation seems to have been a feeling by the courts that
a guarantee of a judicial proceeding was meaningless if the legislature

could simply enact a statute prohibiting activity that was innocent
when performed and thus require the courts to condemn an individual

automatically if the facts were not
in dispute. As Justice A. S. Johnson
256
stated in Wynehamer v. People:
To provide for a trial to ascertain whether a man is in the enjoyment [of his] rights, and then, as a consequence of finding that he
is. .. to deprive him of [these rights] is doing indirectly what is
forbidden to be done
directly, and reduces the constitutional pro257
vision to a nullity.
This notion that conduct that was "innocent" or nonliability producing when performed cannot later be condemned by the government
seems related to the "unfair surprise" standard articulated by the
253. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 45, at 44-48 (discussing use of judge's own values in constitutional adjudication).
254. The notion that the specific mechanism of the due process clauses can be disregarded in interpreting their overall scope is extraordinary, but widely held. It is similar to
arguing that article III of the Constitution was intended to set up a federal court system in
order to achieve national justice; therefore, Congress has the power to give the federal courts
jurisdiction in any case it chooses, whether or not the case falls within one of the specific
categories of jurisdiction listed in article III, § 2, in order that "justice" as a matter of "national" concern may be done. The argument portrayed is obvious nonsense, because it ignores the fact that article III carries specific, inherent, jurisdictional limits on the power to
do "national justice." See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 46984 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 416-17 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H.
Wechsler eds. 1973). But the generalized "reasonableness" interpretation of the due process
clause is no different. The mechanism selected by the Framers and ratifiers of that clause
also limits the power to eradicate "arbitrariness," "unfairness," or "unreasonableness" in its
name.
255. See section III(B) supra.
256. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
257. Id. at 420. See also text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
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Court. The harm of a retroactive condemnation of a party lies in his
inability to remove himself from the ambit of the law being applied to
him, even if he would wish to do so. No amount of good faith or planning will enable the party to escape the government's reach. 58 Yet this
harm seems precisely to be the objection to a law that "unfairly" surprises a party. As Justice Stevens explained: "The application of an
otherwise acceptable rule of law may result in unfairness to the litigants
if, in engaging in the activity which is the subject of the litigation, they
could not reasonably have anticipated
that their actions would later be
259

judged by this rule of law."

Therefore, despite the fact that there is no general "reasonableness" limitation on state legislative power in the due process clause, it is
possible to agree that a law that is applied to parties who could not
anticipate that they would be governed by it is the equivalent of a retroactive law. No amount of effort by the parties could have removed
their conduct from the law's reach, because by hypothesis they were
unable to foresee that the law would be brought to bear on them.
Under these circumstances, it would seem permissible to invalidate the
law as applied to the parties, not because of the "unfairness" in the
abstract of applying the law to them, but because the situation fits
within the narrow boundaries of the retroactivity limitation.
This limitation is, however, a more restricted ground than the legitimate state interest standard now approved by a majority of the
Court. It is apparent that surprise of the sort that would fit within the
nonretroactivity principle would seldom, if ever, occur in cases where a
state applies the traditional territorial rules of conflicts, such as the
place of wrong rule in tort cases, whereas the legitimate state interest
test might well be violated by such an application. 260 Despite the argu258. Consider, for example, Justice Johnson's example of the law imposing a fine or
imprisonment on one who continues to live after age 50. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378, 420 (1856). Obviously such a law could operate prospectively, but it is tantamount to a
retroactive law because it cannot be escaped by any effort on the part of the individual short
of suicide.
259. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring).
260. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 505-06. All members of the Court in Allstate
believed that the Constitution somehow imposed abstract limitations on the states' power to
infringe on the sovereignty of other states in the federal system. The plurality opinion
merged the due process and full faith and credit clauses in its analysis, but clearly indicated
that one or both of the clauses contains more than an unfair surprise limitation. See note
247 supra. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), a
jurisdiction case in which one member of the court, Justice White, clearly indicated that the
due process clause contains both "fairness" and sovereignty-oriented limitations. The other
members of the plurality, Justices Brennan and Marshall, though their opinions were less
clear, seemed to focus on the state's interest in asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
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able desirability of the Court's current approach in a pure conflict of
laws sense, the general understanding of the due process clause will not
support a broader principle than can be fitted within the retroactivity
limitation. Either the states, on their own volition, or Congress, acting
under the full faith and credit clause, will have to establish any broader
choice-of-law doctrines.

Conclusion: Adherence to the General Understanding
At least two sweeping objections might be made to the due process
analysis in this article. One objection could be that the analysis produces an unduly broad interpretation of the due process clause; another
objection could be that the analysis results in an unnecessarily narrow
interpretation. Both objections would have as their central focus the
use of a concept of "general understanding" in arriving at the proper
interpretation of the clause.
The first objection is that the nonretroactivity doctrine is not a
valid component of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because its support in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases was
insufficient for it to be considered a part of the general understanding
of the clause. The consequences of allowing this argument would be
that the due process clause could not be read as limiting state choice-oflaw authority in any manner.2 6' The basis of the objection is the concession made earlier in this article that the nonretroactivity doctrine
was not supported by a majority of the states existing at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.262 From this it might be supposed that there is insufficient certainty that the nonretroactivity cases
actually represented part of the general understanding of due process,
fendant. A clear majority of the entire Court in Woodson expressed the view that due process contained sovereignty-based restrictions on state power. For a criticism of this view, see
Whitten II, supra note 9, at 838-40. Justice Stevens, in Hague, expressed the view that the
full faith and credit clause, rather than the due process clause, contains the sovereigntybased limitations on state choice-of-law authority. See note 249 supra. The dissenters in
Hague, true to their position in Woodson, expressed the view that both the due process and
the full faith and credit clauses contained sovereignty-based restrictions on state power. Cf.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 293 (Framers of the Constitution
intended that states retain many attributes of sovereignty; the sovereignty of each state implies limit on sovereignty of others and this limit is express or implicit in both original Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment). To the extent that the various members of the Court
are incorporating sovereignty-based limits on state authority into the full faith and credit
clause, they are in error. See, e.g., Whitten--Choice of Law, supra note 9, at 62-63; Whitten
I, supra note 9, at 501. To the extent that the due process clause is being used to incorporate
limitations beyond the scope of the nonretroactivity principle, the Court also errs.
261. See note 201 supra.
262. See text accompanying notes 199-201 supra.
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rather than
merely the abberational viewpoint of a substantial
26 3
minority.
There is some weight to this argument. Certainly if there is no
more reason for following a definition than that it has the support of a
minority of the states in the pre-Amendment period, the definition
ought not to control future decisionmaking if it restricts state power
more than any available alternative interpretation. 26 Under such circumstances, it would be unwarranted to assume that the states approved a greater restriction on their power at the federal level than a
majority of them had been willing to establish in interpreting their own
constitutions. 265 This observation is especially true where a separate
minority of cases in the pre-Amendment context articulates some less
restrictive alternative interpretation.266 The existence of doubt, produced by the absence of a formally evidenced general understanding in
a majority of the states, or by controversy between contending minority
points of view, arguably places greater burdens on the framers of a
constitutional provision than would otherwise exist.267 If the framers
wish to obtain the agreement of the ratifying bodies to place restrictions
on themselves, and if the context does not clearly indicate that a restriction will be imposed by the use of certain language, then the framers
ought to particularize their message so that its meaning will be clear.268
In the absence of such particularization, it ought to be presumed that
the states are giving up less rather than greater control over their affairs
through ratification.269 Common sense tells us that when individuals or
states place a restriction on their freedom of action, they will prefer a
restriction that accomplishes their primary objective while leaving
them with the maximum amount of freedom.270 Thus, it seems to accord roughly with the probabilities of the situation to assume that the
states understood a proposed amendment in its least restrictive
meaning.
More importantly, this assumption distributes the obligations of
constitution-making in the most efficient and justifiable manner. The
Congress proposes and the states dispose of constitutional amend263. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 45, at 16, 18 (arguing that it should take more than occasional
abberational use to establish particular definition).
264. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 760.
265. See id. at 760-61.
266. See id. at 760-62, 764.
267. See id. at 761.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 761-62.
270. See id. at 762.
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ments.27 ' The Congress thus acts in the role of communicator, while
the states perform as an audience. There are communicative obligations on both parties to the process, but the initial obligation to use
language in some generally understood way is with the communicator.
When the meaning of the words chosen is not clear, it is both unfair
and inefficient to impose the most restrictive interpretation on the
party-here the audience-whose freedom of action is being limited.
Of course, we have no absolute way of knowing what actual understanding, if any, the audience had of the language used.27 2 It is appro-

priate, however, as a general rule to adopt that meaning which least
restricts freedom of action, because this places the burden of clarifying
meaning on the party best able to shoulder the burden, in this case
Congress.
Assuming the validity of this interpretative framework, can it be
persuasively argued that the nonretroactivity doctrine should be treated
as part of the general understanding of the due process clause? First,
note that absolute certainty in establishing a general understanding is
never attainable. Rather, the courts must measure general understanding on the basis of probability. The judges must look to the best evidence obtainable and be satisfied with it, whether or not it is conclusive
or even relatively satisfactory, and they must abide by the results that
flow from the meaning established by this process, even if the results
are not to their liking. Sensitivity to the way in which the Constitution's Framers would have applied a clause is important in confining its
scope to some maximum boundaries. Therefore, if it can be seen that a
majority of states would have applied a clause in a given way, that
majority application surely ought to control the postratification application of the clause. In the absence of such a majority application, the
least restrictive interpretation concept ought to govern adjudication, all
other things being equal. On occasion, however, all other things may
not be equal, and there may be reasons to adopt a more restrictive interpretation embodied in a minority view as the general understanding of
a provision. Sometimes there are obvious applications of a clause that
271. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
272. For the same reasons that it is impossible to trace the mental processes of the Framers and ratifiers in order to enumerate their "intentions" and thus fix the meaning, if any,
that a majority of them would have agreed upon, it is also impossible to trace and enumerate
the opinions of the many judges, lawyers, and legislators who made up the pre-Amendment
context. We, therefore, employ the concept of "general understanding" as a way of getting
around this problem, so that we may have some basis for attributing meaning to a clause
without simply making it up as we go along. Cf. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 181-82
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the necessity of drawing arbitrary constitutional
lines by reference to history).
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ought to control decisionmaking even when a majority of states have
not approved or considered those applications prior to ratification. For
example, the notice requirements of due process would clearly and
directly flow from the general opportunity to be heard principle, even if
there were no cases requiring notice as a part of due process before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would not be appropriate
to conclude that a less restrictive interpretation-for instance, one that
requires no notice to all-should be adopted in the face of an agreedupon general understanding, such as the opportunity to be heard principle, that requires notice for its effective implementation. 3 To interpret the due process clause in such a manner would disregard its more
fundamental purposes.
Similarly, it is possible to justify retention of the nonretroactivity
doctrine as a part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although a.majority of the states had not approved such a doctrine before the Fourteenth Amendment, a sufficient number had
approved it to preclude the conclusion that it was abberational, and
certainly far more cases approved it than disapproved it. 274 Furthermore, the doctrine was, in one sense, an obvious or easy-case application; it followed directly (and persuasively, in the legal thinking of the
time) from the concept that the legislature could not engage in direct
divestment of rights. The direct divestment of rights standard was itself
an uncontroversial doctrine limiting the legislature's power to engage
in direct adjudication, to bypass the courts by using devices such as test
oaths, and so forth. Thus, derivation of the retroactivity limitation
from this direct divestment restriction was not implausible at the time,
and even today there is some appeal to Justice A. S. Johnson's observation that if a legislature is permitted to enact retroactive statutes, the
guarantee of judicial process is rendered meaningless through indirection. 75 Even if we would conclude as a matter of first impression that
the retroactivity limitation is an awkward or remote deduction from the
central premises of the due process clause, to nineteenth century judges
and lawyers it was apparently uncontroversial, and it is their opinion,
not ours, by which we must measure the general understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, while the case is in some ways a
close one in the absence of a majority point of view in the states, the
balance seems to tilt in favor of the nonretroactivity doctrine.
273. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 763.
274. See text accompanying notes 201-02 supra.
275. See text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
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The significance of the issue is not great, however. As noted
before, an "unfair surprise" standard is narrower than the legitimate
state interest test currently approved by the Court.276 Even if the conclusions of this article were rejected and the nonretroactivity doctrine
were refused enforcement under the due process clause, there would be
very little practical difference in the scope of state conflict of laws authority. The choice is between no due process conflict of laws limitations and a relatively minor limitation.
The second objection to this article's due process analysis is of far
greater practical importance. That objection focuses upon use of the
general understanding as a limitation on the meaning of due process of
law. The objection can take many forms, but the typical approach is
grounded in the seeming generality of the due process language. The
due process clause, it has been argued, is an open-ended provision that
invites judges interpreting it to look beyond its "four corners."27' 7 Prop-

erly understood, this argument is indisputable. The use of general language in a constitutional provision is designed to allow future
decisionmakers to apply it to specific instances that are within the purposes of the clause, but that cannot be foreseen at the time of framing
and ratification. 78 General language is used to deal with a generic
problem, even though some aspects of the problem are as yet unknown
or, more accurately, undeveloped.2 7 9

From this indisputable premise, however, one cannot validly draw
the conclusion that an "open-ended clause" amounts to a delegation of
unfettered discretion to future decisionmakers, allowing them to attribute any meaning they choose to the clause. No constitutional clause is
entirely open-ended-none says: "Go and do justice-what constitutes
'justice' shall be determined by a majority of the Supreme Court at any
given time." All clauses, including the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have outer boundaries that can usually be discerned through an investigation of the generally understood meaning
of the language used at the time of ratification. In the case of the due
process clause we can see that the broadest possible principle incorporated within the clause was the opportunity to be heard---te., the principle that no person can be deprived of a right without first being given
a judicial hearing. Certain applications of this principle, such as the
retroactivity limitation, are also incorporated within the clause. Even
276.
277.
278.
279.

See text accompanying notes 260-61 supra.
See J. ELY, supra note 45, at 13, 14-21.
See Whitten, Book Review, supra note 205, at 1488.
Id.
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though we might not have arrived at these applications in a twentieth
century case of first impression, we can nevertheless see by examining
the pre-Amendment context that they were generally accepted parts of
due process. Other applications, such as the partial law restriction, do
not have sufficient foundation in the pre-adoption context to be carried
over into the Amendment. Because they also are not straightforward
applications of the broadest principle incorporated within due process,
such applications should not survive ratification.
The constitutional obligations of judges enforcing the due process
clause require them to adhere to this decisionmaking structure, or
something very nearly like it. In our system, the power of judges to
declare state and federal laws unconstitutional is based on their owed
fidelity to law.28 In Marbury v. Madison,281 Chief Justice Marshall explained the obligations of judges in the following way:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
.operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty. 28 2
Chief Justice Marshall's words are not simply a justification for the
power ofjudicial review. They inextricably link with that power a correlative judicial obligation to apply the law given to the judge by superior lawmaking institutions.283 When dealing with constitutional
provisions, this obligation means that the judge is duty-bound to apply
84
the law given to him by the Framers and ratifiers of the provisions.
At the most fundamental level, it requires the judge to make a good
faith effort to understand what the Framers and ratifiers meant when
they used certain language in a clause.285 At the very least, this obligation means that they may not disregard the historical understanding of
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 756-58.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177-78.
See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 756.
See id.
See id. at 756-58.
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the persons who adopted the clause.2 86 As noted earlier, there will
never be a way of establishing this historical understanding conclusively,287 but such inconclusiveness does not release the judges from
their good faith obligation to try to discern how the Framers and ratifers used the language they selected.2 8 It merely requires the judges
to rely on probability in determining meaning. The probablegeneral
understanding is thus what they must seek. 289 To adopt a different
mode of decisionmaking in constitutional cases clearly violates the separation of powers doctrine from which the courts' authority to engage
in judicial review is derived.290
286. This is a principle securely grounded in the proper role of a judge in our system of
separation of powers. See, e.g., L. HAND, How FarIs a Judge Freein Renderinga Decision;"
in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103 (3d ed. 1960) "[T]he judge must always remember that he
should go no further than he is sure the government would have gone. had it been faced with
the case before him. If he is in doubt, he must stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting
interests in the society for which he speaks would have come to a just result, even though he
is sure that he knows what the just result should be. He is not to substitute even his juster
will for theirs; otherwise it would not be the common will which prevails, and to that extent
the people would not govern." Id. at 109.
287. See text accompanying notes 272-73 supra.
288. Even in cases where we' are uncertain how the Framers and ratifiers would have
drawn a constitutional line, because of new or changed circumstances, the proper performance of the judicial obligation imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers will often
require the judges to draw the line in accordance with historical forms, rather than inventing
an arbitrary line of their own. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). "[I]n cases where arbitrary lines are necessary, I would have thought it more
consonant with our limited role in a constitutional democracy to draw them with reference
to the fixed. bounds of the Constitution rather than on a wholly ad hoe basis ....
The line
must be drawn somewhere, and the difference between drawing it in the light of history and
drawing it on an ad hoc basis is, ultimately, the difference between interpreting a constitution and making it up as one goes along." Id. at 181-82. Although Colgrove involved the
constitutionality under the Seventh Amendment of a local rule of civil procedure for the
District Court of Montana providing for six-member juries in civil actions, Justice Marshall's remarks have equal or greater force when applied in other contexts, such as where the
Court is attempting to establish the outer boundaries of a general clause, for instance, the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
289. See Whitten II, supra note 9, at 755.
290. This is not to suggest that a simple dichotomy between lawmaking and law application is to define the judges' role. It is suggested, however, that the judges' lawmaking or
policymaking role should be confined. See N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 187-88 (1978) ("Wide issues of legislative policy ought to be the concern of the
political legislature, especially in democratic societies. Judges ought to abstain from taking
side on issues of actual or potential partisan political controversy. Yet on the other hand the
law as administered in the courts ought to exhibit coherence of principle, and should not be
'a wilderness of single instances', and so far as a society has, or is believed or perceived to
have, certain values shared across party political differences and personal tastes, these 'common sense values' ought to be realized in its laws. These potentially conflicting principles
can be kept in equilibrium by maintaining the principle that distinction and separation
ought to be maintained between legislative and judicial functions and powers, not inthe
over-simplified terms of legislators making the laws and the judges only adjudicating upon
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CHOICE OF LAW AND DUE PROCESS

It should, therefore, be apparent that judges may not legitimately
construe the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to con-

tain restrictions on state choice-of-law authority that are broader than
can be justified under the nonretroactivity doctrine. Because that doctrine is adequately supported in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment context, it may be considered a part of the general understanding of the
due process clause.2z ' Similarly, because the "outrageous" or "unfair"
surprise standard is closely related to the purposes of the nonretroactiv-

ity doctrine, the standard may be employed as a limit on state choiceof-law authority under the clause. The result is that the courts may
conclude that a state violates due process whenever it applies a law that
292

the parties could not have anticipated would govern their conduct;

however, the due process clause does not justify any greater restriction

on state choice-of-law power. The probable general understanding of
the Framers and ratifiers of the clause simply did not extend far

enough to warrant imposing broader choice-of-law restrictions on the
states.
The combined result of this narrow interpretation of the due pro-

cess clause and an equally narrow interpretation of the direct effect of
the full faith and credit clause is to place the responsibility for formulating broad-based, national choice-of-law standards upon Congress.
As noted earlier, I have elsewhere argued that the full faith and credit

clause does not directly impose any restrictions on state conflict-of-laws
authority.293 Nevertheless, it is clear that if it chooses, Congress has
wide power to establish nationwide conflict-of-laws rules to govern the
states under that clause.294 The constitutional structure thus permits
those laws, but in terms that the necessary judicial law-making function required in the
interests of consistency and the pursuit of'commonsense' values ought to be subject to definable restrictions. The highly desirable recognition of a judicial power to make law must be
restricted by recognition of a duty to make it only 'interstitially' .").
291. Indeed, the nonretroactivity doctrine has been described as a part of the traditional
doctrine of separation of powers presupposed by the ideal rule of law. See, e.g., J. LuCAS,
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 113-14 (1966) ('The Ideal Rule of Law presupposes the traditional doctrine of the Separation of Powers, which is itself only an approximation. It lays
uRon each organ of government its appropriate restriction, namely: (i) The Judiciary must
apply existing law, not make up new laws. (ii) The Executive must act only on the instructions of the Judiciary in applying coercion. (iii) The Legislature must enact only general
laws, not Acts of Attainder, nor retrospective laws.").
292. See text accompanying notes 259-60 supra.
293. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra; Whitten-Choice of Law, supra note 9, at
62-63.
294. See Whitten-Choice ofLaw, supra note 9, at 62-63; Whitten I, supra note 9, at 60405.
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federal control of choice-of-law through legislative action.29 5 Given
the checkered history of the Supreme Court in evolving coherent con-

stitutional standards to control state choice-of-law decisions, comprehensive legislative activity seems highly desirable. 296 Even if legislative
activity is not forthcoming, congressional inattention to the problem
certainly cannot justify Supreme Court action to fill the void. The doctrine of separation of powers bars judicial inovation that exceeds the
ratigeneral understanding of the due process clause at the time it was
297
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295. In fact, the full faith and credit clause of article IV, § 1, is itself a provision that was
designed to allocate exclusive responsibility for national conflict of laws doctrine to Congress. See Whitten-Choice ofLaw, supra note 9, at 62-69; Whitten I, supra note 9, at 60305. As a consequence, considerable protection was afforded to the states that their sovereign
status relative to other states, as that status existed in 1789, would not be modified without
an opportunity for representation and participation in the act of modification through the
political branches of government. See Whitten--Choice of Law, supra note 9, at 68-69;
Whitten I, supra note 9, at 604.
296. Such legislation is desirable, but concededly not likely. Congress has perhaps been
even worse than the Supreme Court in exercising its power under the full faith and credit
clause. See Whitten-ChoiceofLaw, supra note 9, at 60-62; Whitten I, supra note 9, at 59799 n.439.
297. The ordinary "criteria for judicial justification" are said to be: "(I) that a court
publicly justify its decisions by giving reasons for them; (2) that a decision be consistent with
principles, policies, and other decisions to which the court adheres, (3) that a court give
weight to its earlier decisions bearing on the case before it; and (4) that the judgment of the
court operate retroactively." P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
1086 (1975). These criteria are at best only necessary conditions for the legitimacy of a
judicial justification; in themselves they are not sufficient. The reasons a court gives must be
keyed to sources of law given to it at a primary level by other institutions-in constitutional
adjudication, for instance, the source would be the Framers and ratifiers.

